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Some Origins of German Petroleum Policy
(1900-1914)

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GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

During the years 1900 to 1912 there is no substantial evidence that the German government had established a preconceived policy relative to petroleum needs at home or in the quest for resources abroad. It did not assume an active policy until 1912 when the question of a government controlled petroleum monopoly arose. It is in the policies and practices of the German great corporate interests since the turn of the century that the origins of the government policies in 1912 and since that time are to be found.

German petroleum policy in the pre-1914 period may be determined from the facts of the conflict between the German interests and the Standard Oil Company, particularly after 1906, for the control of the importation and marketing of petroleum and its by-products on the German domestic market. The history of the consequent movement toward a German government controlled monopoly (1912-1914) reveals through government publications and unofficial but authoritative articles the German outlook on the petroleum question. Furthermore, the effort to expand control over foreign resources especially in Rumania serves to indicate German policy. Finally, observations and conclusions of the contemporary authorities, both German and foreign, on the world petroleum situation provide further sources illustrative of German policy. The following conclusions are based, for the most part, upon these sources.

In the period 1900 to 1914 there were at least four primary and at the same time interrelated forces in the German petroleum

question. The first was that of a progressively increasing demand for petroleum and its products by the government, industry, and the general public. There was, secondly, a desire to free at least the importation and marketing and eventually the sources of supply from foreign control and place them in German hands. Consequently, the third determining force was that of successfully eliminating the exclusive position held by the Standard Oil Company over the German market, and finally, the corresponding desire and necessity of exploiting and importing new petroleum resources under German control.

As a result of these considerations the ultimate objective of German policy consisted primarily in bringing the petroleum needs of the empire entirely within the control of agencies of German nationality. It will be noted here that no absolute distinction is made between domestic policy and that of German interests abroad. Such a distinction is scarcely possible inasmuch as the needs and conditions of the domestic market dictated the efforts abroad. In short, the story of German petroleum interests prior to 1914 provides an excellent example of economic nationalism.

The struggle of the Germans to achieve control over sources of petroleum and over the domestic market was governed by facts and considerations peculiar to the domestic petroleum situation. The struggle resulted in a futile attempt to undermine the position of the Standard Oil Company in the German market and an equally unsuccessful effort to minimize dependence upon Russian and other foreign controlled resources. The principal result was, however, the actual achievement of a predominant position in the Rumanian petroleum industry and over the potential resources of the Near East. Prior to 1914 the Near East remained inactive, however, but the Rumanian industry was of vital concern to German interests.

The following material will illustrate some of the principal considerations involved in the attempt of Germany to realize a petroleum policy based upon the nationalizing of the control of her petroleum needs.

Prior to 1914 German domestic petroleum resources both actual and potential were wholly inadequate to meet the demand in spite of energetic efforts to expand and develop domestic production. Domestic production was insignificant by comparison both with foreign production and with German importations from abroad.¹ Even the resources of Germany's ally Austria-Hungary, which were greater than those of Germany, were inadequate to alone meet German domestic needs.

The rapid industrial advances made by Germany prior to 1914, the constant increase in new uses for petroleum discovered at this time, the armaments race, the advent of the Diesel engine, and the new technological processes in the petroleum industry then being developed were only a few of the factors which resulted in a progressively increasing demand in Germany for petroleum. While realizing these considerations, the Germans were also aware that, in view of the political events in international relations and particularly in the event of war, their principal sources of petroleum and the control of their home market were in the hands of foreigners at least geographically remote if not politically opposed to Germany, i.e., the United States and Russia. Furthermore, because of the extreme nationalistic sentiment and Germany's comparative independence relative to other industrial resources, such as coal and iron, the German position in regard to petroleum was considered intolerable. The following table will indicate both the degree of German dependence upon foreign controlled petroleum and the increase in the demand of the German market.

¹ *Petroleum Zeitschrift* (Berlin), vols 1900 to 1914 give production statistics by months for these years. See also, Reichsamt des Innern, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Reich* (Berlin) for these years.

TABLE I²

GERMAN PETROLEUM IMPORTS (in metric tons)

Year	United States	Russia	Austria-Hungary	Rumania	Others
1900	825,205	128,330	25,143	9,539	
1901	819,114	127,313	27,335	16,261	
1902	795,015	144,784	26,034	22,714	3,667
1903	792,648	147,821	44,986	28,359	24,818
1904	803,023	133,793	48,546	30,692	46,327
1905	897,239	120,231	53,186	21,040	60,543
1906†	561,278	55,853‡	43,204	23,734	62,554
1907	813,828	66,196‡	81,905	46,896	76,242
1908	846,753	57,540‡	140,093	30,584	74,301
1909	762,901	49,889‡	139,903	45,910	82,071
1910	833,345	28,155‡	124,664	68,461	
1911	818,613	16,093‡	142,937	85,864	
1912	691,012	29,257‡	125,967	77,709	
1913	616,676	17,493‡	119,680	83,496	

† March to December

‡ Asiatic Russia only

German attempts to undermine the position of the Standard Oil Company finally resulted in the monopoly movement and further motivated a vigorous and ultimately successful effort to control the Rumanian resources. That both of these programs were essentially nationalistic and not based entirely on sound economic considerations is evidenced by situations that resulted from attempts of the Germans to carry them to completion. Some of the principal features of these two programs as instruments of German petroleum policy are herewith indicated.

It is not feasible nor is it necessary to examine here the rise of the Standard Oil Company to a paramount position in the importation and marketing of petroleum and petroleum products on the European continent and particularly in Germany prior to 1914. It should be remembered, however, that the Standard Oil Company did dominate the European petroleum market to a degree sufficient to cause it to be regarded as a potential world monopoly

² Adapted from the *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1902, 127; 1906, 146; 1908, 175; 1910, 194; 1912, 225; and 1914, 203. These figures do not include benzine, petroleum by-products such as various lubricants, vaseline, etc. They do include naptha, however. "Others" meaning the Netherlands East Indies, Mexico primarily. Absolutely reliable data for these sources is apparently not available.

by the Germans, and other Europeans as well.

It was between 1906 and 1912 that the rivalry of the Standard Oil Company, which the German banking groups and others attempted to overcome, became progressively more intense. By 1912 it was quite apparent that the German concerns had made no substantial progress toward weakening the position of the Standard Oil Company in the German market. Quite the contrary, practically all the German great interests and their affiliates had come to terms with the Standard Oil Company at one time or another during these years and out of necessity because of the latter's tremendous holdings particularly in the sources of supply.³

There was one possible outstanding exception to the above statement in the case of the Deutsche Bank and its petroleum company the Steaua Romana for they maintained their independent and German character throughout the entire period. This does not mean, however, that the Deutsche Bank did not negotiate with the Standard Oil Company or that it was entirely German in personnel, but it does mean that it maintained an independent attitude and policy and definitely opposed the Standard Oil Company's position. The Deutsche Bank and the Steaua Romana were also free of influence and control by non-German interests to an extent greater than that of any other German concern. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the agitation for a German petroleum monopoly under the supervision of the German government began in the years 1912 to 1914 that the Deutsche Bank and its Rumanian petroleum interests should assume a position of leadership for the attainment of such a monopoly.⁴

An analysis of events leading up to the monopoly movement itself is required inasmuch as German petroleum interests in Rumania would receive a new and greatly increased importance

³ "Das Kampf um das Petroleum," in *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, und Wirtschaft im Deutschen Reich* (Leipzig, 1900-1914), XXXVIII, Pt. II. Hereinafter referred to as *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*; "Le Monopole du Petrole en Allemagne," in *Revue Economique Internationale* (Brussels), XII (1914), Pt. 2-3; and D. G. Munro, "The Proposed German Petroleum Monopoly," in *American Economic Review* (Ithaca, 1914), IV, among others for excellent contemporary accounts of the foregoing generalizations.

⁴ *Ibid.*

relative to the German market in the event of the establishment of a German petroleum monopoly.

In the competition between the German interests and the Standard Oil Company the latter was actually represented by its subsidiary, the *Deutsche Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft* (DAPG), which had control of the importation and marketing of Standard Oil products in Germany.⁵ The DAPG had been created as early as 1890 well in advance of the principal German concerns. It is believed that the Standard Oil Company had one half the voting stock of the DAPG, but the rest was held by their German correspondents chiefly in Prussia. The latter were, of course, dependent upon Standard Oil for their source of supply.⁶

In the years prior to 1914 there were only a few petroleum importing companies in Germany, the principal ones being the Standard Oil Company, the Pure Oil Company, the *Deutsche Erdöl A-G.*⁷ and the *Deutsche Petroleum Verkaufsgesellschaft*. The first named of these through the DAPG imported about one half or more of Germany's petroleum imports during these years, and the rest was divided about equally between the other concerns. It was believed at the time by those interested that the Pure Oil Company was also an agent of the Standard Oil Company if for no other reason than the large number of shares allegedly held in it by Mr. Rockefeller.⁸

THE MONOPOLY AND GERMAN POLICY

The reasons given by the German petroleum interests for the necessity of a German monopoly over the importation and marketing in Germany of petroleum and petroleum products were based on nationalistic arguments centering around the fear of a world monopoly by the Standard Oil Company. This fear was upheld by the students of the problem at that time and by the various political elements.⁹ The political parties in the Reichstag which

⁵ *Jahrbuch der Berliner Börse* (Berlin), vol. 1913-14. Hereinafter referred to as *JBB*.

⁶ D. G. Munro, "The Proposed German Petroleum Monopoly."

⁷ *JBB*, 1913-14, 1488-1492, for a history and account of its activities.

⁸ Munro, 320.

⁹ The monopoly question and its relation to the great banks was the source of extensive contemporary literature on the subject particularly in such periodicals as *Die Bank* (Berlin, 1913), *Petroleum Zeitschrift*, and *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*.

opposed the original monopoly ideas, such as the Center party, did so, in part, according to their traditional political principles, but they were generally agreed that the government was justified in taking some action to check what they regarded as a dangerous foreign trust.¹⁰ In the Reichstag committee, which dealt with the bill for the proposed monopoly, the Center party led the minority opinion, but it favored negotiation with the Standard Oil Company as offering the most promising results especially if the latter were bound to a state cartel. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, believed that the private monopoly of the Standard Oil Company could be overcome only by a thoroughgoing state monopoly.¹¹ Much of the opposition was really based on fear of the increased power that would result from the great banks, particularly the Deutsche Bank, if such a monopoly were created rather than a dislike of the idea of monopoly or favor of the maintenance of the position of foreign interests. The Deutsche Bank defended its position in part by the following statement in its annual report for 1912:¹²

"In the year under review (1912) we have rendered the German Government the desired assistance in the preparation of the bill for the introduction of a government monopoly for illuminating oil in Germany. Our oil enterprises would derive no other advantage for the passing of this bill than any other oil producer, i.e., the liberation of the German market from the control of a foreign concern. We have at no time sought any further advantage."

The movement toward a government controlled petroleum monopoly in Germany resolved itself into a question of whether the Germans wished to substitute a local monopoly for a foreign trust.¹³ In concluding his article Dr. Schneider stated that the matter amounted to how a highly developed nation like Germany could free herself from the "economic tyranny of a foreign trust."¹⁴

¹⁰ Reichstag *Debates*, 1912-13, 1913-14. See also, "Le Monopole du Pétrole en Allemagne."

¹¹ *Petroleum Zeitschrift* (Berlin, 1914), 870-78 for the views of the various parties as represented in the Reichstag committee, and "Rückblick und Ausblick in der Leuchtstofffrage," *ibid.*, 10.

¹² Deutsche Bank *Annual Report 1912* (Berlin, 1912), 13.

¹³ "Petroleummonopol oder Kartellgesetz," *Die Bank*, 1913, 736-47.

¹⁴ "Das Kampf um Petroleum," *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, XXXVIII (1913), Pt. 2.

We are not concerned here with the political reaction in Germany to the monopoly question which can be readily gained from the Reichstag Debates for the sessions 1912-13 and 1913-14 and from other contemporary discussions. One is further justified, upon study of these accounts, in reaching the conclusion that the German policy in regard to petroleum and its marketing was based primarily upon nationalistic objectives as well as upon economic considerations.¹⁵ This conclusion is also substantiated when one realizes that the proposed monopoly originally and primarily was concerned with illuminating fuel. The monopoly could not completely eliminate foreign controlled petroleum or its products from the German market nor could it be expected to do so. Probably the most important consideration was the fact that German controlled Rumanian sources could not possibly furnish quantities of either crude petroleum or refined petroleum products to meet the demand of the German market. It is exceedingly doubtful if the entire Rumanian production and export could have compensated the Germans for the elimination of American controlled petroleum imports. Although Rumanian production of petroleum was exceeded only by that of the United States, Russia, and Mexico, in the period 1900 to 1914, it was but a small percentage of the total world production.¹⁶ In spite of these facts the Germans and particularly the Deutsche Bank hoped by controlling the Rumanian industry to find adequate compensation for the reduction of the American controlled petroleum imports into Germany.

There is no substantial evidence that the Standard Oil Company through the DAPG abused its favorable position in the German market. If the Standard Oil Company constituted a threat to Germany, it was more of a nationalistic rather than of an economic character. It would seem quite apparent that a German monopoly

¹⁵ Arthur von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, in a speech on March 14, 1913, stated that Germany dared not allow a foreign monopoly control over petroleum because of its essential value to the military preparations of Germany's army, fleet, and industries. *Petroleum Zeitschrift*, November 11, 1913.

¹⁶ United States Department of Commerce; Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Rumania an economic handbook* (Washington, 1924), 106. Rumanian production totaled two and nine-tenths per cent in 1910 and three and six-tenths per cent in 1913.

could not hope to import and market petroleum in any form at the same or lower costs as the Standard Oil Company had been able to do. The reasons for this conclusion are to be found in the vast sources of supply available to Standard Oil but not to the German monopoly. The extensive transportation facilities of the Standard Oil Company and its vast organization for the control of practically every economic factor involved, including the marketing of petroleum products on the German market, simply could not be equalled or even approached by a German government controlled monopoly. Moreover, prior to 1914 Germany could not at any time depend alone on the continental sources of petroleum but was forced to deal with Standard Oil. This is clearly evident from analysis of German petroleum statistics.

Nevertheless, the most serious attempt to break the power of the Standard Oil Company is to be found in the Deutsche Bank and Steaua Romana. It was this group that took the lead in the agitation for a German government controlled monopoly.¹⁷ Contrary to the statement in its annual report, as stated above, the Deutsche Bank logically and correctly would profit by such a monopoly and evidently expected to dump its entire Rumanian production on the German market via the proposed monopoly.

The terms of the proposed monopoly have a particular significance inasmuch as they represent the climax in the conflict, in 1912, between the German and foreign controlled petroleum interests. These terms indicate the place of Rumanian petroleum resources relative to the German market and are also interesting in view of the subsequent developments of the war period. They represent the first definite policy of the German government relative to petroleum.

¹⁷ The Deutsche Bank got control of the Steaua Romana in 1903 (it had been created in 1895) and reorganized it. In 1914 they created the *Deutsche Petroleum A-G*, a holding company, in cooperation with the Darmstädter Bank, the Wiener Bankverein, the National bank für Deutschland, the Mitteldeutsche Credit-bank, and J. S. H. Stern for the purpose of marketing German controlled Rumanian petroleum in Germany in competition with the DAPG of Standard Oil, cf. *post*, p. 15. Arthur von Gwinner was a director of both the Deutsche Bank and Steaua Romana and a member of the Prussian Herrenhaus.

The proposals for a government controlled petroleum monopoly first appeared officially as a government report to the Reichstag, at the later's request, during the winter session of 1912-1913.¹⁸ A history of the bill would indicate that perhaps it came at a rather inopportune time politically. It was set aside quite frequently, along with the discussion of the petroleum question in general, by the much debated armament bills of 1912-1913 and 1913-1914. It was still in the Reichstag committee in the spring of 1914. The original proposals provided, in brief, for the following:¹⁹

1. Creation of a corporation with a thirty-year monopoly over the importation and wholesale marketing of petroleum.
2. Said corporation to be comprised of a consortium of the German great banks having at least one-half the voting shares and the rest to be held by private investors.
3. The Reichsbank to be the guardian of the stock.
4. Transfer of stock with the consent of the imperial chancellor only.
5. No distinction between the consortium as a class and the private investors as a class in the division of profits.
6. The shares to private investors to be sold on the open market.
7. Imperial commissioner to be appointed by the chancellor to have complete supervision of the administration of the corporation.
8. Imperial chancellor to approve election of all officers of the monopoly.
9. Imperial chancellor to appoint a board of twenty experts to advise the commissioner on methods and help supervise the monopoly.
10. Numerous other provisions apparently aimed at safeguarding public interests in such matters as prices, profits, and their control.
11. Monopoly to take over all property, equipment, and personnel of existing importers deemed necessary and compensate former holders for that which is not employed by the monopoly.

Any hopes, however, for the achievement of such a monopoly were destroyed when, at the close of the Reichstag session in May, 1914, no final action had been taken. The Reichstag committee reported that it had not made sufficient progress to warrant submitting the matter to the Reichstag for further reading and debate.²⁰ Therefore, further action was automatically postponed

¹⁸ *Begründung zum Gesetzentwurf über den Verkehr mit Leuchtöl*, Reichstag Drucksache 13 Legislatur-Periode, 1 Session, 1912, No. 544 contains the text of the original bill.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* Also "Das Leuchtöl Monopol nach den Beschlüssen der Reichstagskommission in zweiter Lesung," *Petroleum Zeitschrift*, 1913, 373-80 for a lengthy discussion with amendments and recommendations.

²⁰ *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* (New York, 1914), XCVIII., 1567.

until the next regular session the following November. In the meantime the European war began and with that event German policy entered upon a new and different phase.

The Rumanian interests figured prominently in a number of major problems which arose before the Reichstag committee. The problems dealing with supply and transportation relative to the price of petroleum on the German market were the most difficult. The transportation phase of the question occupied much of the time in the discussion of the monopoly. The methods then employed were inadequate and complicated by political and military considerations. All the routes were subject to foreign interference particularly in event of an international crisis. The principal routes from Rumania were the Danube river and ocean-going tankers to Hamburg. Germany imported primarily refined rather than crude petroleum from Rumania. The refined products were usually sent by the Danube river route whereas crude petroleum was shipped by tanker to Hamburg. The principal Danube port for Rumanian petroleum was Regensburg which was also a major petroleum refining center.²¹ In spite of the foregoing facts the Germans hoped to minimize the importance of Standard Oil in the domestic market and at the same time keep the costs and prices down to the levels established by the latter.

The advocates of the monopoly also claimed that the Rumanian petroleum industry would prosper and looked forward with optimism for the success of such a plan. Dr. Schneider, for example, in "Das Petroleummonopol" quoted the Rumanian publication *Petroleum Monitor* as saying that, in effect, the Rumanian petroleum industry had long awaited such a favorable program which would save the industry from the dangers on uncontrolled fluctuating of prices on the world market.²²

THE RUMANIAN FACTOR

With these facts in mind let us consider the actual status of the German petroleum industry in Rumania relative to German policy,

²¹ "Die entwicklung der Monopolfrage" and "Zur Monopolfrage," *Petroleum Zeitschrift*, 1913, and other contemporary periodicals. The aforementioned periodical also gives monthly statistics on port clearances of all petroleum tankers in German ports.

²² *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, XXXVIII, 354.

the monopoly movement, and its competition with the Standard Oil Company during these pre-war years. Inasmuch as the German great banks held a major position in formulating German petroleum policy, a brief summary of the principal features of their promotion of the Rumanian resources is essential.

The Discontogesellschaft was particularly active in the promotion of the Rumanian petroleum industry. In 1901 it led a consortium which included the S. Bleichröder bank and a number of English banks in the creation of the Telega Oil Company, Ltd. with a capital of \$1,112,000.²³ In 1905 this company came under the complete control of the German banks. In this same year the Discontogesellschaft, S. Bleichröder, the Telega company and the Industrie des Petrol de Paris created the Vega Oil Refining Company with a capital of \$720,000.²⁴ In the following year, 1906, the Discontogesellschaft and S. Bleichröder created a company entitled the Credit Petrolifière with a capital of \$1,200,000 for the purpose of facilitating further the expansion of German capital as well as the exploitation of Rumanian petroleum resources.²⁵ In 1907 an additional \$400,000 capital was contributed to the Credit Petrolifière when the Allgemeine Petroleum Industrie A-G of Berlin and the Banca Marmorosch Blank et Cie were admitted to the Discontogesellschaft-Bleichröder consortium.²⁶

In 1907 the Telega company and the Bustenari company merged to form the Concordia Company with a capital of five million dollars, but when the latter joined the Deutsche Erdol A-G, its capital was reduced to two and one half million dollars.²⁷ The Bustenari company was also created by the Discontogesellschaft-Bleichröder group in 1903 with a capital of \$365,00.

The principal efforts of the Dresdener Bank and the Schaaffhausen'scher Bankverein were in the creation of the Regatul Romana A-G and its successor the Astra Romana. These were

²³ G. Diouritch, *L'Expansion des banques Allemandes à l'Etranger* (Paris, 1909), 357.

²⁴ Kaiserreich und Königreich Österreich-Ungarn, Handelsministerium, *Berichten der Konsularämter in Rumanien* (Wien, 1909), 33-41.

²⁵ Diouritch, *ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Berichten*, 1912, p. 50. Also, *JBB*, 1912-13.

Dutch companies, however.²⁸

The Steaua Romana under the control of the Deutsche Bank was the oldest and by far the strongest of all the German concerns. It was, indeed, far more powerful than most other foreign concerns.²⁹ It was created in September, 1895, and actively controlled by the Wiener Bankverein and its subsidiaries until 1903 but the Deutsche Bank had the main interest in it.³⁰ The Steaua Romana experienced financial reverses between 1900 and 1903 and in the latter year it was reorganized and directly taken over by the Deutsche Bank. The principal reorganization was in regard to its commercial phase in order that it might compete more effectively with the American interests both in Rumania and in Germany. The final result of the reorganization of the Steaua Romana was the creation of the Deutsche Petroleum A-G.³¹ The stock of the DPAG was originally twenty million marks held as follows:³²

Deutsche Bank	11,100,000 Marks
Wiener Bankverein	5,000,000
Darmstädter Bank	1,250,000
Nationalbank für Deutschland	1,000,000
Mitteldeutsche Creditbank	900,000
J. S. H. Stern	750.00

The DAPG, the Shell Transport and Trading Company³³ together with the Steaua Romana in the same year, 1904, increased the capital of the Petroleum Produkte A-G., also a German firm, from \$914,000 to \$112,000 with the right to market all refined petroleum of the Steaua Romana. Prior to 1904 the Petroleum Produkte A-G had confined its activity to the German market but for the remainder of the period it sought to establish control over the entire continental market.³⁴

By 1914 German petroleum interests in Rumania were thus

²⁸ *Berichten*, 1911, p. 41. For details see the *JBB*.

²⁹ *JBB*, 1913-14, p. 1496 for a statement of its financial position and history.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1912-13, pp. 1429-31. See also E. G. Anninos, *Der wirtschaftlich Einfluss Deutschlands auf die Petroleum Industrie Rumaniens und ihre Bedeutung für die internationale Wirtschaft* (Giessen, 1926), 40-89.

für die internationale Wirtschaft (Giessen, 1926), 40-89.

³¹ P. B. Whale, *Joint stock banking in Germany* (London, 1930), 100-101.

³² Anninos, *ibid.*, 80.

³³ A member of the powerful Royal-Dutch-Shell concern.

³⁴ Parliamentary Papers, House Sessional Papers: *Accounts and Papers*, XCI, No. 3432.

controlled primarily by three principal banking consortiums, the Deutsche Bank group, the Discontogesellschaft-Bleichröder group, and the Dresdener Schaafhausen'scher-Royal Dutch group.

TABLE II³⁵
GERMAN BANK GROUPS AND THEIR
PETROLEUM COMPANIES IN 1911-1912

Deutsche Bank:		
Steaua Romana	1895	\$10,000,000
Discontogesellschaft:		
Vega	1905	750,000
Credit Petrolifiere	1906	1,000,000
Concordia	1907	2,500,000
Dresdener-Schaaffhausen'scher:		
Regatul	1905-11	4,800,000
Astra Romana	1911	12,000,000

To further their interests the German marketing agencies of the reorganized Steaua Romana and the Deutsche Bank were the Petroleum Produkte A-G of Hamburg and the Deutsche Petroleum A-G of Berlin, as noted above.³⁶ In 1913 the DPAG and the Steaua Romana created the Steaua Romana Petroleum G. m. b. H. in Bremen for the purpose of marketing Rumanian petroleum and petroleum products including lubricants in particular and also benzine.³⁷ The Deutsche Bank group formed a union with the Nobel-Rothchild exporters in 1901 entitled the European Petroleum Union³⁸ to supplement the deficiencies of the Rumanian production of kerosene. For a time, prior to 1906, mixed Rumanian and American products had been put on the German market. The European Petroleum Union bought, particularly kerosene, from the Shell Oil Company, but the Deutsche Bank group could not effectively compete with the Standard Oil Company. By 1907 the Steaua Romana had suffered further financial reverses to the extent that the dependencies of the Deutsche Bank came to terms with the DAPG. For example, as late as 1912 the Deutsche Erdol A-G, which imported Rumanian and Austrian petroleum, made an agreement with the Standard Oil Company by which

³⁵ Adapted from the *Berichten*, 1912, 46-57; 1913, 46-52.

³⁶ *JBB*, 1912-13, p. 1440.

³⁷ *Petroleum Zeitschrift*, October 15, 1913, p. 111.

³⁸ *JBB*, *ibid.*

the latter was allowed a percentage of their import into Germany. By 1912 the Deutsche Bank and the Steaua Romana were the only ones still consistently independent of the Standard Oil Company insofar as the importation and marketing of petroleum into Germany was concerned.

In the years 1912 and 1913 the Deutsche Bank's interest in Rumania were, as usual, primarily confined to the promotion of the petroleum industry. The bank assumed an optimistic outlook in its statement of 1913 and announced a virtual doubling of the capital stock of the Steaua Romana from about ten to twenty million dollars.³⁹

"The undertakings under our patronage in the petroleum industry again had a prosperous year and the prospects for the current year are likewise encouraging. The oil producing 'Steaua Romana' increased its dividend to 10% and raised its capital to \$19,047,619 of which one-half is fully paid up and the other half to the extent of 25%. The Deutsche Petroleum A-G which holds control of the 'Steaua Romana' increased its dividend to 8% and intends shortly to raise its capital by an issue of M.13 million (\$3,571,428) new shares 25% paid. This concern also is in a healthy condition and has strong reserves. The European Petroleum Union showed gratifying results, which are also encouraging for the current year. The increasing use of combustion engines and of Diesel motors in particular, combined with increased consumption of liquid fuel by navies and mercantile marines, has brought about a great demand and record prices of these products. Prices of lamp oil followed this movement in most countries, Germany excepted, where the proposed introduction of a Government monopoly is being resisted in every possible way by the holders of the private monopoly who are keeping kerosene prices at an artificially low level."

In March, 1914, the DPAG reported the same facts and stated that from October, 1912, to September, 1913, was the best period since it had been founded.⁴⁰ Incidentally, it may be noted here that the outbreak of the Balkan Wars and the mobilization of the Rumanian army reduced somewhat the personnel of the German firms in Rumania, but they were not otherwise materially affected by the wars.

In Table I the actual position of the Rumanian petroleum in the monopoly question and in competition with Standard Oil Company may be observed. In regard to the data on Rumanian petroleum these factors should be noted. They represent the total

³⁹ Deutsche Bank, *Annual Report* 1913, p. 12.

⁴⁰ *Petroleum Zeitschrift*, February, 1914.

German import from Rumania and not just from German controlled sources. All German controlled production did not go to Germany but to other markets as well. Although figures for given years are existent the percentage of the above imports, in Table I, which came from German sources and the percentage of such production which went elsewhere cannot be accurately ascertained for the entire period.

The following statistics on Rumanian crude petroleum production will also indicate the importance of Rumanian petroleum to German policy and the proposed German government monopoly.⁴¹

TABLE III
PRODUCTION OF CRUDE PETROLEUM

Year	Metric Tons	in Rumania	
		By the Steaua Romana	
1905	614,870	1904-05	209,797 metric tons
1906	887,091	1905-06	218,473
1907	1,128,087	1906-07	328,340
1908	1,147,727	1907-08	335,954
1909	1,297,257	1908-09	341,489
1910	1,352,289	1909-10	445,998
1911	1,544,072	1910-11	402,728
1912	1,806,942		
1913	1,885,225		
1914	1,783,977		

In 1913 it may be noted that the total Rumanian export of petroleum was only 1,056,197 metric tons, which, on the basis of value, represents approximately nineteen percent of the total exports as compared to sixty-seven percent for cereals.⁴²

In conclusion, it may thus be observed that Germany's petroleum policy was based primarily on nationalistic considerations supported by the great banking interests and not alone upon sound economic considerations. German policy failed insofar as its objectives were to eliminate the position held by the Standard Oil Company in the German market, and the dependence upon foreign controlled petroleum, and to obtain adequate petroleum from the Rumanian resources.

⁴¹ Adapted from *JBB*, 1912-13, p. 1439; "Das Petroleummonopol," *Schmoller's Jahrbuch*, XXXVIII; and *Rumania an economic handbook*, 354.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 141.

Basic Principles of U.N.R.R.A.'s Policy

GEORGE C. GUINS

We are living at the time of an important and significant evolution of International Law. It has had until now the character of private law. Like a private person in human interrelations, every state, every nation was free in its self-determination. Even in case of war between two or more nations other nations witnessed it as if it were a quarrel between neighbors, so long as it did not harm their own interests. The League of Nations itself was constructed as a kind of private association, every partner of which retains his right to withdraw and to refuse submission to the decisions of the majority, in contradistinction to a corporation in which the majority decides for all.

Hitler's attempt to resolve the problem by the creation of a superstate only strengthened the revival of nationalism. Yet the necessity of coordinating international activity remains an actual problem and some other form of decision was sought. The first step in this direction was made by the so-called Kellogg Pact which qualified war as a crime against humanity.

Another idea of an International Organization, corresponding to modern needs and psychology, as conceived at Dumbarton Oaks and approved at San Francisco. The new projected order of international cooperation does not suppress the freedom of separate nations, does not subject them to arbitrary decisions. It assumes that the new World Security Organization shall not be an association but a kind of corporation: the decision of the majority will acquire a compulsory force, though every member of the United Nations reserves for itself a degree of independence.

An impressive example of such cooperation is U.N.R.R.A.

During and after the first World War, the United States generously assisted the suffering peoples of Europe. The United States acted on its own initiative and independently of any other nation. Under the energetic and skilful leadership of Herbert Hoover, A.R.A. saved many lives in Belgium, Russia, Czecho-

slovakia, Poland, Rumania, Finland, and other countries.

The experience of this humane organization gives many instructive examples as to how to organize the supply and distribution of food and to repatriate refugees.

Why U.N.R.R.A. and not A.R.A.? This question was answered by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in his address to the new organization on its birthday:

"Responsibility for alleviating the suffering and misery occasioned by the so-called New Order must be assumed not by any individual nation but by all of the United and associated nations acting together. No one country could — or should, for that matter — attempt to bear the burden of meeting the vast relief needs, either in money or supplies."

Mutual responsibility and joint work, instead of the independent activity of one rich and generous country, reflects a profound upheaval in the social and political trends of the present-day world.

For a better understanding of U.N.R.R.A.'s policy it is necessary to study some of the basic principles which compose its ideological background.

The scope and method of U.N.R.R.A.'s activity is ingeniously expressed by its Director General, Herbert Lehman, in a short formula: "Help people to help themselves." This expression not only determines the scope of the two R's' policy (more than Relief and less than Reconstruction), but gives a clear directive to all U.N.R.R.A.'s agents. However this formula does not cover all questions which might arise in connection with U.N.R.R.A.'s activity. Participation in U.N.R.R.A. requires of its members some kind of self-limitation. Can we believe in the possibility of such a self-limitation while a growing nationalism jealously resists any restraint of national freedom or self-determination? How real are the chances that such international cooperation can be realized to even a small degree and will not represent merely a noble endeavor, one of those which pave the road to Hell?

Or, for example, here is another question: if U.N.R.R.A. is

an international organization, why are not neutral states invited to participate in its operations?

To answer these and many other questions we are in need of a general understanding of international cooperation in the present-day world.

There is something other than compulsory subjugation in cooperation based on mutual interest and voluntary union. Such a union excludes the danger of the emergence of a totalitarian superstate. Under normal conditions states will not be forced into submission; the proposed coordination supposes a consciousness that all separate states are co-participants in the formation of a new international order, in which all are interested. It was taken for granted that all members of the United Nations recognize that their actions and interests must be coordinated, if possible, of their own will, and only in case of extreme necessity by force of constraint.

The *spiritus movens* of this cooperation, its dominating idea is "solidarism." The distinction between solidarity and solidarism should be compared with that between sociality and socialism. Solidarity has been in existence for ages past, since the time when society was first engendered. "Solidarism" is a projected social and legal system brought into effect after corresponding education and reorganization on the basis of principles of solidarity.

The idea of "solidarism" had been instilled over a long period, and met with some success in France, where it was pronounced to be the "Philosophy of the Third Republic." It was extensively disseminated by L. Bourgeois, Bouglais, and Charles Gide, who did not ascribe to it, however, its fundamental meaning nor develop it into a definite program.

There is no need to have recourse to artificial formulae to find the tenets of solidarism. From a psychological point of view it corresponds to the immemorial and natural motive of human conduct — solidarity.

In their mutual relations people are guided not only by feelings of egoism and altruism. Man is a "social being," and social instincts are natural to him as they are to other living creatures. One of their manifestations is actions directed by the principles of solidarity.

This is no novelty and has long since been taken into account, in ethics as well as in sociology, under specific terms such as "mutualism." But, generally speaking, the contrast of egoism and altruism has taken so firm a hold on our consciousness, especially in the field of juridical literature, that it predetermines a series of important deductions and constructions.

It could be explained by the simple and scarcely disputable fact that egoism was and still is a predominant factor of human conduct. As a contrast and reaction it was opposed to altruism and therefore solidarity, though constantly a factor, remained in the shade.

Consequently *two* types of conduct are contrasted, egoism and altruism; *two* systems of social life, individualism and collectivism; *two* methods of juridical order, civil and public law; *two* systems of economy, liberalism and socialism.

But in reality a man, in his relations with others, is guided not only by egoism and altruism but also by solidarity. The last can be allied in no way with egoism — because it brings us into a close contact with the interests of others. Nor is it altruism, since it pre-supposes the conscious knowledge of mutual utility, and not only to the advantage of others. Behavior founded on the consciousness of solidarity is expressed in concessions, compromise, reconciliation, and is not disinterested but based on the mutual benefit of all participants.

Not every concession, every act of submission, is founded on self-denying service of benefit to other people or to society in general. It may be based on the consciousness that the subjection of personal advantage to the common weal brings greater profit to the individual and for this reason is effected in the interests of and within the limits of the common good.

The acceptance of the fact — that the individual, under present

conditions, is not able to secure his interests without the active aid of society or of the state, forces him to be subservient to those demands of social order that, if infringed upon, would leave him helpless in his struggle for existence.

The same could be applied to a state. It is acknowledged that "a community of states bound by common aspirations and a framework of international institutions is the only realistic basis for a more durable peace. Any other attempt will sooner or later suffer wreckage."¹

The cult of "each one for himself" has had its day, but, on the other hand, the absorption of the individual by the state, that "totalitarian" regime under which the state disposes of the individual at will, is intolerable.

The idea of an isolated state, living for itself, is no less antiquated and the necessity for coordination of mutual interests is recognized.

That is the principle on the basis of which U.N.R.R.A. is established. It has been well said that "U.N.R.R.A. reflects solidarity between the invaded countries and the countries whose material sufferings have been so much less in so many ways; it symbolises the spirit and practice of mutual aid which has been fostered by grim necessity during the war, and which must be maintained at all costs in the emergency post-war period."²

Both the consciousness of national interdependence in matters connected with winning the peace and the necessity of several self-limitations and voluntarily assumed obligations are components of the ideology which inspired the creation of U.N.R.R.A. It is not simple charity, as was A.R.A.'s assistance to Soviet Russia during the famine of 1921-1922.

It is well understood now that, just as it was impossible to maintain a world half slave and half free, so a world half rich and half poor is dangerously unstable, both economically and po-

¹ Dr. Frank Munk, *The Legacy of Nazism*, Macmillan 1943, p. 271.

² *UNRRA: Gateway To Recovery*, Edition of National Planning Association. Washington, D. C., 1944.

litically, and therefore as inflammable as a powder magazine. As concerns this country in particular, "a full-time operation of its mills and farms depends unavoidably upon available foreign and domestic markets in which to sell its goods, and if Europe and Asia are bankrupt and prostrate they cannot buy American products."³

However, U.N.R.R.A. is not a political or business enterprise masking the egotistical interests of one or several great powers. U.N.R.R.A.'s assistance to suffering nations bears no resemblance to the assistance given underground forces during the war, no matter of whom they were composed, provided that they carried on the struggle with the common enemy. U.N.R.R.A.'s assistance is beyond commercial calculations of possible profit. Its real policy could be understood only in the light of the idea of solidarism.

Having accepted this idea, we can easily understand why separate nations which protect so jealously their unlimited sovereignty are nevertheless ready for self-limitations in some cases and for sacrifices in the common interest. For example, the so-called Multilateral Agreement concerning displaced persons says: "While each contracting party will retain full control over displaced persons in its own territory, it will nevertheless give U.N.R.R.A. all possible assistance to enable it to carry out its task and will consult with U.N.R.R.A. on matters involving international aspects of the problem." Could it be otherwise when we are faced with a stream of millions of people threatening to spread epidemics and complicate all economic problems of current life?

According to the Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which is the constitution of U.N.R.R.A., one of the functions of the Administration is:

"To formulate and recommend measures for individual or joint action by any or all of the member governments for the coordination of purchasing, use of ships and other procurement activities in the period following the cessation of hostilities, with

³ *Ibidem*.

a view to integrating the plans and activities of the Administration with the total movement of supplies, and for the purpose of achieving an equitable distribution of available supplies. The Administration may administer such coordination measures as may be authorized by the member governments concerned" (Art. I, b).

This policy of many activities of different nations will be a test of solidarism in action.

U.N.R.R.A. naturally can unite only those nations which manifest their solidarity. This cannot be acknowledged without reserve as concern nations remaining neutral in World War II.

Solidarism must penetrate the whole organization of U.N.R.R.A. from the top to the bottom: there must be cooperation between representatives of 44 nations, members of U.N.R.R.A.'s staff — composed of persons belonging to various nations and races, and groups of displaced persons collected in the same assembly centers, different though they be by origin, nationality, physical and mental qualities, their past and their possible future.

U.N.R.R.A.'s goal is connected with a transient period and its organization is temporary, but its principles and ideology anticipate an evolution of the present world. Some of the activities in which U.N.R.R.A. is engaged, now considered to be of a temporary nature, in time may well be recognized as vitally important and so become permanent. For the nearest future its goal is "to help people to help themselves," for the more distant — "to help nations to become devoted members of humanity," "to help peoples to fortify their solidarity," "to strengthen international connections."

By helping a nation to help itself, U.N.R.R.A. can concentrate its assistance in regions where the government realizes public works or projects on a large scale, such as that blueprinted for China by Sun Yat-sen. If U.N.R.R.A., for example, will assist in rehabilitation, especially of the regions where construction of an important railway will be started by the Chinese Government, it will open a market for selling locomotives, coaches and other transportation machinery, and create a basis for constant economic interdependence and consequent future solidarity.

Both idealism and realism are indispensable components of U.N.R.R.A.'s policy. This policy is not born in the stratosphere of the intellect but in a pool of social and political cataclysms. It is armed not only with principles suitable for prophecies but also with food and medicines.

To conquer people's hearts, U.N.R.R.A. must bring tangible material assistance to those who need it. To fulfill its historical mission, U.N.R.R.A. must follow the principles of solidarity and avoid any kind of intervention in social or political clashes of groups, parties, or classes among the people needing its help.

Democratic Gains From Wartime Bureaucracy

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There is probably more discussion of bureaucracy today than ever before in our nation's history. Most of this discussion centers upon the recent trend toward the entrance of government into new areas of public service, and the expansion of the federal government to gain controls and production essentials to the prosecution of war. Some of it, however, is no more than the normal criticism of bureaucracy as grist for the political mill each four years in the election of a chief executive.

On the one hand there are those who conceive of bureaucracy as an octopus-like monster, a parasite on society so bound up in its own red tape that all it can do is multiply and in its growth choke business to certain death. This notion is popular among some political speakers, especially among those whose chief interest is in gaining power and who, once in power, would doubtless continue the very system they criticise. An increasing amount of this type of criticism is coming from some of the business and professional men of our nation. There is, in many instances, little clear thinking, but an abundance of name calling and labelling which may be contributing to the problem rather than to its solution. If the name calling and the pitting of group against group continues, a condition may be brought about that will force upon us the very controls we now criticise in bureaucracy.

The other line of discussion comes from those who are trying earnestly to analyze the problem and to contribute to the development of an effective civil servant group to administer the will of the people. As these critics remind us, the policy of the entrance of government into new areas of service (and the consequent expansion of bureaucracy) is the responsibility of the citizenry who through their representatives can at any time

* The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and under no circumstances are to be considered as those of the OPA.

change that policy. It is, of course, quite possible that the people have not concerned themselves enough with the functioning of democracy and the the present status does not reflect the actual will of the people.

One point on which a number of critics agree is that bureaucracy is evidence of an important trend toward "letting the government do it." This has been expressed in various ways. Ludwig Von Mises states it clearly: "... bureaucracy in itself is neither good nor bad. It is a method of management which can be applied in different spheres of human activity . . . What many people nowadays consider an evil is not bureaucracy as such, but the expansion of the sphere in which bureaucratic management is applied . . . People blame bureaucracy, but what they really have in mind are the endeavors to make the state socialist and totalitarian."¹ If, then, criticism of bureaucracy is actually a concern over the establishment in our own country of a type of state control similar to that against which we are united in waging a war, it behooves us to take stock of our activities and make the necessary adjustments so that we shall not, in winning the war, lose the victory for freedom, liberty and justice.

Paradoxical as it may seem, some of our hopes for winning the real victory and making democracy work are to be found in one of the most criticised and potentially one of the most bureaucratic of all war agencies, the Office of Price Administration. The OPA in carrying out its responsibility for controlling prices and rents and in administering the rationing of scarce commodities certainly has had the opportunity of becoming a gestapo in the everyday lives of our citizens. Thus it may be encouraging to consider how basically democratic the OPA has been and to see what contributions it is making toward a functioning democracy and the possible solution of many vital post-war problems.

The OPA was first established under executive order and functioned with a sort of "jawbone" control of prices until Jan-

¹ Ludwig Von Mises, *Bureaucracy*, New Haven (1944), 44.

uary 30, 1942, when the Emergency Price Control Act went into effect. It was not until the renewal of the Price Control Act in 1944 that Congress put teeth into the matter of price control and wrote an Act expressive of its ideas. In the meantime, however, an organization was set up to control prices and ration scarce commodities. The basis of this organization is the 5569 local War Price and Rationing Boards, composed of local citizens serving without compensation, who are in a position to deal with local problems on the basis of intimate knowledge of their communities. Board members are assisted by clerical employees paid from Federal funds, and by many volunteers who contribute their time to the job of rationing and price control.² The Board serves as a two-way channel: from the people to OPA administration, with a flow of questions, hardship complaints, suggested regulations, reports of violations, etc.; and from OPA administration back to the community with interpretations instructions, new regulations, etc. Local Boards have been called variously judges, juries, educators, administrators, arbiters, and committees of neighbors; they are actually the community's source of information regarding OPA programs, fair distribution of scarce goods, cost-of-living control, personalized consideration, and adaptation of national policy to local conditions.

Local Boards have not always followed regulations set forth by the National Office. On occasions they have taken matters into their own hands and given citizens rations when they were not technically entitled to them. On the other hand, when the Boards have known of abuses of rations, they have refused applications when technically the applicant qualified for the ration, as in the case of the doctor who used his gasoline for a vacation instead of for visiting patients. Such deviation is not good bureaucratic administration, but it is certainly democracy in action and thus a significant commentary on OPA organization.

In spite of the bungling and confusion of war agencies, it

² The total OPA staff, including volunteers and paid workers, in national regional, district, and local communities is 250,663. Of this total 71%, or 188,048, are regularly employed volunteers and 29%, or 62,615 are paid employees. Of the paid employees, 3,902 are in the National Office.

must be admitted that the result in tanks, guns, planes, and other equipment of warfare has been beyond expectation. This has been made possible by the sacrifice, the patriotic cooperation, and the hard work of citizen volunteers. While, unfortunately, this enthusiasm of war work cannot be expected to carry over into the solution of post-war problems, we may hope that a considerable number of this group of workers will be ready for an intelligent participation in government affairs as we return to peacetime democracy.

Again, looking at the organization and personnel of the OPA, we find other contributions to a functioning democracy and potential help for post-war conditions. One of these is a technique for local administration of a national governmental program. It has already been pointed out that the basis of the OPA organization lies in a group of citizens serving without compensation in each community. This leadership could not have been bought at any price, nor could the confidence in and the stability and acceptance of the program have been secured without the alliance of leading citizens of the community. As these leaders gave of their time, the idea spread, and from all walks of life thousands have helped carry out the program of OPA. These volunteers have done everything from general clerical work to serving as Price Panel assistants who check prices, help distribute literature, and give information about the price program. Three observations should be made concerning the benefits of this organizational technique based on the volunteer citizen: (1) The actual cost of administration is materially reduced and the tax burden lightened. It is impossible to estimate the dollar-and-cents value of the time and ability invested in the war effort by volunteers. This technique replaces, in some measure, our practice of paying others to carry our part of the responsibility for government. (2) A personal and localized administration of the program results; the community is guided and regulated by those who know the problems as they exist in that particular community. (3) People are more easily influenced by their fellow citizens than by remote national leaders. Objectionable features of a program are less objectionable when

administered locally. The use of this technique in selective service is evidence of its practicality. The fact that those administering the program are local citizens means that in each community there are leaders who know the program thoroughly and who, in telling their fellow citizens about it, are educating that community at the same time that they are administering the program.

A second vital contribution toward a functioning democracy is a trained group of potential civil servants. Paid employees of the District, Regional, and National OPA offices are for the most part not traditional bureaucrats. In the beginning there was not available a civil servant group from which the new agency could be staffed. Therefore, recruitment had to be from the business men, the lawyers, the accountants, the economists, the professors from the four corners of the nation. Although these men were unfamiliar with the procedure and problems of government agencies, they were already successful in the conduct of their business and were leaders in their professions. They brought a new spirit to the government, a spirit of success, of refusing to take no for an answer, of "getting the job done" one way or another. Here, indeed, was a "New Zeal Bureaucrat" who worked too much, who did not clear everything with authorities before giving answers, who cut red tape without a qualm and remained as critical and as impatient with that red tape as he had been before entering government service. Some of these recruits could not adjust themselves to the methods of such a large organization, but thousands of others, having found their sphere, are making real contributions and are experiencing genuine satisfaction in serving the public.

OPA has had ample opportunity to make mistakes and has certainly made its share. Many of these mistakes might have been avoided had there been a civil servant group to whom we could have turned for management problems. Too many of the executives and specialists have bogged down in administrative detail. Inability to marshal all the forces into one coordinated effort has been one of the pronounced weaknesses of the war agencies.

From this group of New Zeal bureaucrats it may be possible to establish a group of civil servants worthy of the responsibilities they must carry. It will require immediate action to interest these individuals in continued government service before they return to their private fields, or they will be lost from a civil service career. (The term civil service is used here to denote a class or group of worthy individuals devoted to serving the public by administering its will as expressed in the law written by elected representatives. It is unfortunate that a reference to the Civil Service Commission does not always connote this, although the Commission has made a beginning in the development of such a group. In this regard, it doubtless must rethink its program and function.) Much has been written concerning the developing of an effective civil servant group, suggesting among other things a raising of salary levels in higher positions in order to compete for the best men, and the basing of advancement in responsibility and salary on demonstrated ability instead of on an arbitrary measure of length of service. Action should be taken now to institute such a revision, for we have available at present a group of people with more intensive and varied training in government service than they could previously have received over a much longer period of time. They now know the satisfaction that comes from serving the public, and many could probably be enlisted to become the type of civil servants necessary to make democracy work.

The third contribution of wartime bureaucracy to peacetime democracy lies in the training of citizens. A larger number of people have during these war years been educated in the affairs of government than ever before in our history. Many a private citizen has been brought in behind a government desk to administer a program, there to be confronted with all the problems involved in serving the public equitably and efficiently. They now have a new appreciation of some of these problems and surely will have more tolerance toward others who may strive to solve similar problems in the future. Because of this very experience they will be more capable of discharging their duties as citizens interested in the affairs of government.

In addition, most of the volunteers in the OPA program have been given some training in practical economics. This is particularly true of the advisory groups who have assisted in establishing policy in an industry or trade. They have had to understand the basic principles of our whole economy and especially the problems of inflation and their relation to a particular business group. In a less specialized sense the board members, Price Panel assistants, volunteer speakers and even clerks who have had to explain programs to the public, have been trained in basic economic problems. Many of these people found such problems entirely unfamiliar, but, once introduced into this area, they will henceforth be more aware of the significance of government action and thus will be able to exercise more intelligently their responsibilities of citizenship.

There is real significance in the fact that these volunteers have found time to give to the war effort, and have found this extra time when there was a great expansion of business and a simultaneous labor shortage. What was responsible for this interest on the part of citizens who gave their time in the midst of so many other demands? If it was a sense of patriotism during war time, then it is obvious that one of our biggest problems is to arouse in these citizens this same patriotic spirit in peace time.

Only through an aroused, intelligent citizenry shall we be able to have the kind of local planning, cooperation, assumption of responsibilities, and solution of local problems with local resources that will be necessary to win the victory in the post-war world. Our soldiers are going to return with a new sense of international responsibility. Certainly the problems of these global responsibilities will require our patience, tolerance and intellectual understanding if we are to avoid the mistakes of the last war. At the very time that these decisions of international significance are being made, we at home will be faced with the task of proving that our form of democratic government will work, without succumbing to the trend toward a socialist or totalitarian state. If this is to be done, with all the problems of unemployment, reconversion, relocation of population, infla-

tionary and subsequent deflationary trends, we must utilize every possible contribution so that all our democratic forces may be marshaled by an awakened citizenry in winning the ultimate victory for freedom and justice.

The Habsburg Problem

ROBERT RIE

"This is the curse of our noble house:
To aim on half ways at half deeds
With half means halfheartedly.
Yes or no, — here is no compromise."

I

We may predict with considerable certainty that after the end of the present World War peace aims will pivot about alternatives, as they did during the Congress of Vienna 1814-15: the alternatives then were "legitimacy" or "liberalism"; tomorrow they will be "world-organization" or "isolationism".

Liberalism is essentially Protestant; legitimacy, Catholic. But these terms are used in a broader sense than that of narrow confessional interpretation. Up to the beginning of the Reformation the basic idea of legitimacy was the recognition of sovereigns by the Pope. This sometimes necessitated the bestowal or renewed bestowal of the royal dignity by the bearer of the tiara upon the head of a country, as for example in the cases of Stephen I of Hungary and John of England. After the Reformation legitimacy changed its meaning, but until the end of the Holy Roman Empire (1806) no regime on earth was considered legitimate, unless it had received the recognition of the Holy Roman emperors. This was a sort of temporal detour of recognition by the Roman church. Recognition must not have been denied to such a regime, although it might have been non-Catholic or even non-Christian. The concept of legitimacy is the law temporal derivative of the eternal and divine law of the Church. Where non-legitimate claims of rulership are brought forward, religiosity determines the thinking of the "legitimists", whom we find everywhere, even long before the term was coined.

When, as happened recently, the supreme Russian prince of the Orthodox Church, the late patriarch Sergius, denied the Pope the prerogative of succession as "vicarius Christi" and "princeps Apostolorum", the Russian thereby rejected the legitimacy of the Roman Bishop's claim upon supremacy within Christendom in

general and within Catholicism in particular. When Pius XII repudiated this negation, the Pope thereby reiterated the Roman-Catholic viewpoint: that the Bishop of Rome is vicar of God's Son and successor to the Prince of the Apostles.

The essence of legitimacy is the idea of legitimate succession. A "legitimistic" (as distinguished from "legitimate") claim arises when law temporal grants this claim, provided that law temporal derives from law spiritual. Wherever we find the roots of law spiritual, its teacher and interpreter for the Catholic, and before the Reformation for every Occidental Christian, is the Pope—the absolute and infallible mentor of all Catholics in matters of creed and doctrine since Pius IX and the Vatican Council of 1870.

This recognition of the Pope as the living source of divine law is a relatively new theory as compared with the Roman constitutional doctrine that the Emperor is the "fons" of law temporal. Only tradition elucidates the position of the first popes up to the time of the Council of Nicaea (325), while Diocletian's position is well defined by his own organization of the empire. The emperor is the remains "fons juris"; and "source" as well as "law temporal" enter into the wider orbit of law spiritual and its teacher, when, as a mediaeval development, the empire was ultimately dominated by the Pope and the Church. In the charter of enfeoffment, (December 27, 1282) whereby the first Habsburg king of Germany, Rudolph, invests his sons Albrecht and Rudolph with the Austrian lands, the king's position is already superior to the law temporal, but still subordinated to the law spiritual.¹ This took place when peace had already been established between the German state and the Roman church, and when the popes no longer aimed at weakening the German crown, because the Interregnum from the death of Conrad IV to the election of Rudolph had clearly proved the danger involved in Central-European anarchy. Pope Gregory X, therefore, admonished the German princes to elect a strong

¹ "Rudolph, by the grace of God, etc. Albeit the ruler of the Roman empire is not bound to observe the law, as the creator of laws cannot be restricted by the common law, he nonetheless recognizes necessarily the domination of the law natural, which rules everywhere and everything. . . . Therefore We, invested though with the exalted dignity of royalty and placed high above right and law, humbly bow Ourselves before the august law natural"

king, otherwise he would appoint one by his own authority.² The papal right of exercising regency during a vacancy of the royal throne was stated less than fifty years later by John XXII in the bull *Si fratrum*. However, it never became possible to exercise an imperial right of regency during a vacancy of the papal see. It is indeed remarkable that in the same era the German princes, in a strongly "Protestant" state document, obviously regarded the divine right of the emperor as stemming directly from God without any papal mediation. A special state instrument was issued in this matter.³ Yet toward the end of the 13th century, Pope Boniface VIII was still able to assume an extremely critical attitude towards a candidate for the imperial throne simply because of his personal appearance: Albrecht was one-eyed and ugly.⁴

Five hundred years later the idea of royalty had changed. In the preamble to his charter of 1814 Louis XVIII admits that his constitution must fulfill the expectations of an enlightened Europe, and he reserves for himself — in the alleged interest of his subjects — the rights of the royal prerogative. The contrast in the era of the French Restoration lies therefore in the alternatives of "liberalism" (enlightened Europe) and "legitimacy" (divine right of kings). We can ignore the fact that the Europe of Metternich and the *Alliance Sacrée* could hardly be called "enlightened". Yet during the Congress of Vienna one still hoped for a liberal compromise between revolutionary and legitimistic ideas; indeed, the former member states of the Confederacy of the Rhine, France, the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and England still clung to their parliamentary or representative system, while the principal powers of the continent, Austria, Prussia, Russia and Turkey as well as several small German and Italian states retained their absolutely despotic forms of government.

It is worthwhile, however, to emphasize that the most important

² Bischoffshausen, Dr. Sig. Frhr.v. Sechshunderfunfzig Jahre Habsburg und esterreich. Wien 1932. S.10.

³ "Imperialis dignitas et potestas est immediata ab Deo." Pragmatische Sanktion des Frankfurter Reichstags 1338-39. James Bryce, "The Holy Roman Empire." New York, London. McMillan 1904, p. 538.

⁴ Bryce, *ibid.* 221.

state document of the constitution which was issued for the restored French kingdom and which in itself was the incarnation of reactionary thought, already mentions Europe as if it were a concrete, liberal organization.

Thus we approach one of the most difficult questions, which challenges our modern "ability of discernment": does adherence to the idea of a higher organization — "Roman-German Empire", "enlightened Europe", "League of Nations" — mean adherence to a progressive or to a reactionary idea? One must not forget that the political slogans of factions consistently confuse ideas, and that adversaries are indiscriminately berated as reactionaries, Romanists, atheists, heretics, Jacobins and Bolsheviks. But how do matters stand in reality?

The implication that Lutheran Protestantism represents the emphasis of Germanic individualism over Roman-Catholic universalism is more nearly a platitude than an historical truth, although it was from this premise that, even at the time of Hitler's childhood, H. St. Chamberlain was unfortunately able to develop a far too nationalistic philosophy of history from a pangermanistic, though "kuein-deutsch", point of view.

That Luther, who never wished to destroy the Roman empire or to diminish the authority of the church, was not always regarded as a man of progress by his intellectual contemporaries, is proved by the cynical enunciation of Erasmus: "*Ubi cumque regnat lutheranismus ibi literarum est interitus.*" Should we find ourselves inclined to look upon Benedetto Croce as an unbiased judge, since as a liberal philosopher, a thorough student of German history and thought, and a Catholic Italian he is likely to stand above the different intellectual trends, we should stress his antilutheran judgment: "that German Protestantism for several centuries was unable to produce anything in the fields of science, of criticism and philosophy."

Luther's alleged loyalty to the emperor is unimportant. Although the Reformation was looked upon as a nationalistic relapse rather than a progress not only in Germany, one must not allow the Reformation to be pictured as a reactionary movement. Yet

its effects, the peasant-wars with the ensuing anti-Jewish pogroms, the destruction of churches, monasteries and masterworks of ecclesiastical art will impress upon us the analogy with Nazi excesses, in which a thoroughly reactionary movement assumes a national, and at times even an international revolutionary guise by employing the paramarxistic slogan "Liberation of the nations from Jewish capitalism."

The last and greatest political consequence of the German Reformation was the final dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, the actual end of the universalistic conception and the emergence of the German memberstates upon the political world-stage. "But Europe emerged unsubdued and free from this terrible war, in which it had recognized itself for the first time as a coherent society of nations; and this interdependence of states, which first developed in reality during this war, would be in itself sufficient gain to reconcile the cosmopolitan with its cruelties." The writer of these magnificent, but disputable sentences, is Schiller,⁵ the great poet, Protestant, idealist and disciple of Kant, who attempted to prove that the final result of the Thirty Years War was the victory of the universalistic conception, the idea that Europe was an entity. But in so doing he fell victim to a remarkable fallacy; he simply said that Europe became a political entity because all the great nations of Europe fought in this war of the German Reformation. That is in modern terminology: the concept of a League of Nations exists because of world wars.

When one of the German states, Prussia for instance, found itself at the peak of its power, it again proclaimed the imperial idea; but now upon a narrower, more rigid basis. The Holy Roman Empire was never nationalistic as was the later Bismarck-empire. With incomparable, typical arrogance the latter had been called by the prophetic Prussian state-philosopher the "empire of the European center," long before its foundation⁶ The universalistic idea of the Holy Roman Empire projected itself upon Germany and strengthened national sentiment into aggressive

⁵ "Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges" 1, 1.

⁶ Hegel, Naturphilosophie, § 340. Zusatz.

nationalism! What a path, what a strictly logical path leads from Luther to Leibnitz and Hegel, — from Hegel to Wagner to — Hitler!

The German realm did not have the good fortune to change its constitution from an elective into a hereditary kingdom and thereby to achieve at least a theoretical stability, although it must be admitted that there was some justification for the parallel: "Pope elected — Emperor elected." The German royal crown was so closely bound to the Roman imperial crown that the latter conferred its almost hallowed character upon the somewhat inferior rank of a German king.⁷ By the 12th century the election of the German kings was already considered a lasting constitutional characteristic.⁸ Subsequently, however, Rudolph I and his son, king Albrecht, the first Habsburgs, endeavored to gain papal consent to the establishment of a German hereditary monarchy.⁹ In spite of their sympathy, the Popes were not in a position to influence the other German princes in favor of such a constitutional change. The royal reward for the papal efforts was the support of the church's territorial claims. During the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) the borders of the Pontifical state were fixed according to the deeds signed by King Rudolph I, who confirmed ecclesiastical claims upon the enlarged territory of the *Patrimonium Petri* for time everlasting.

After Albrecht II, however, the crown of the Holy Roman Empire was inherited *de facto* by the heads of the house of Austria. Due to the shrewd policy of his successor, Frederick III, the Holy Roman crown became a part of the Austrian "Hausmacht" (allodium or dynastic power), — possibly a degradation, as German nationalists might say. We must not forget in this connection that the peculiar German situation of that period allowed no other solution. The violent individualistic sense of independence, — we might call it "Teutonic egoism" — led each German princeling to make his own specific policy, to use his

⁷ "Der mittelalterliche Ursprung der Nationalstaaten," Brackmann, Albert. Sitzungsbericht der preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1936, No. CIII, 128-139.

⁸ Gulielmus Brito, Script. XXVI, 334.

⁹ Bischoffshausen, *ibid.*, 21 ff.

own petty centrifugal power for the disadvantage of the central authority. The reproach that the House of Habsburg also used its own power in a way which weakened the whole realm is unjustified. The strengthening of the Habsburg sphere of influence was necessary to strengthen the entire realm. It is certainly, not to be suggested that the Habsburgs were motivated by altruism or by ethical considerations, though Leopold von Ranke honored the emperor Frederick III, the founder of the modern Austrian "Hausmacht"-policy, with the epithet of "serious honesty." The Habsburgs acted only logically, since the identity of the bearer of the Imperial crown with the bearer of the crown of the "House" made the power of the empire a function of the "Hausmacht." There is one important proof that nothing was done in the Austrian lands to decrease respect for the empire: even after the catastrophe of Sadova (1866), the Habsburgs were looked upon as Germans in their non-German provinces,¹⁰ although they did not regard themselves as Germans in the same sense as did other German princes.

The Habsburg empire when organized as the Empire of Austria by the last Holy Roman Emperor Francis II (Patent issued August 11, 1804), revived the magnificent, imperial-Roman universality, in the era of Napoleonic, imperialistic-revolutionary rationalism. At the same time the Habsburg emperor sought by his assumption of the second imperial dignity to invest legitimacy with glamour, such as Napoleon had gained in this same year, 1804, by bestowing the imperial dignity on his monarchy — illegally as it seemed to the legitimists. The grounds for conferring the imperial name and character upon all the Austrian lands are enumerated in a memorandum addressed to Emperor Francis by the State Chancellery:¹¹

1) The number of Protestant electors had increased since the peace-treaties with Napoleon, wherefore a real danger arises that respective Habsburg candidates and their adherents might be outnumbered in the elections at Frankfort-on-the-Main.

2) Equality in rank with France must be guaranteed.

¹⁰ "Oesterreich und die Burgschaften seines Bestandes." Fischhof, Adolf, Wien, Wallishauser. 1869, p. 27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 65.

Now the authority of an imperial crown was conferred upon the greatest legitimate house in Europe; and two years later, in 1806, the Holy Roman Empire was officially dissolved.

In spite of all reproaches of a narrow "Hausmacht"-policy, one must, for the reasons already mentioned, look upon Austria as heir to the second Roman empire; although Napoleon I, by his assumption of the imperial title, had filed his claim upon this heritage. The following facts backed Austria's case: 1) The recently lost crown of the Holy Roman empire had belonged to the respective heads of the Habsburg house from the time of Albrecht II, with only one exception. 2) In spite of her defeats in the Seven Years War and in spite of the humiliations, suffered at Napoleon's hands, Austria remained the foremost power in Germany and held its hegemony until Sadova, 1866. 3) The Habsburgs were still the only German princes with an imperial title and remained so until 1871. 4) The House of Habsburg ruled vast lands, which had belonged to the Second Roman and *not* to the German Empire. Thus the monarchy became the first "Empire, composed of nationalities, which was transformed into a modern representative state."

Did the Austrian crown hereby suffer a form of degradation from the universalistic ideas of the Second Roman Empire to the regional-organization system of the Habsburg empire?¹² Dare we express contempt?

The actions of an individual or a group of individuals are subject to ethical judgment and may deserve respect or contempt; historical developments do not fall into this category. The fate of France in 1940 is a tragic historical development in its last phase, but it is not contemptible, while the actions of her or other nations' Quislings are contemptible. The robberies of a Hermann Goering are abominable, contemptible and not without some comical aspects, but National Socialism is a development, — it calls itself a "movement."

The shrinking of Austria's power; the resignation of the Roman-German crown, source of medieval, legitimistic, i.e. in a certain

¹² "Grundriss der österreichischen Reichsgeschichte." Luschin, A.v. Bamberg, 1914.

sense reactionary law; the growth of a state composed of different nations upon different levels of culture is a development, which, under certain conditions, could have produced new, favorable and even ideal fruits.¹³

II.

The interest historians and biographers since olden times nourished for the house of Habsburg, or better: "House of Austria", has even grown since the fall of the dynasty. This interest has also a biological implication, for few families have been made the object of such thorough studies by contemporaries and later historians; few families in the course of the centuries have been to the same extent characterized, analyzed and portrayed by world-renowned artists. We find at the very first glance certain basic characteristics, peculiar to members of the family, — a family, which was formerly a Roman-German, or at any rate a Central-European enterprise, such as were, on a somewhat lower level, the Rothschilds, the Krupps, the Fuggers, the Welsers, and in the Far East the Mitsui. However, no other of the various psychological or physical traits are as frequent or as distinct in the house of the Habsburgs as their strong feeling for the family or, to use a more exact expression, their "Hausgefühl". Unhappy marriages occurred and feuds between brothers, but every Habsburg harbors a feeling of reverence for the "Haus", which thus becomes an almost mystic idea, a symbol. It is the symbol of a first universalistic and ultimately Central-European idea.¹⁴ One can observe a certain, reluctant attitude in some very hostile anti-Habsburg libels of modern Austrian socialists, when the "Haus" itself is mentioned, even if this or that of its members is the object of a most violent attack. The dynasty comprised many great and magnificent personalities, who at least enjoyed the respect of the greatest men of their own times.¹⁵

A historian of Hungarian descent, Oskar Jászi, one of the severest critics of Habsburg, understands the Habsburg empire

¹³ Fischhof, *ibid.*, 29.

¹⁴ "The Habsburg Monarchy," Steed, Wickham. London 1913, p. 12.

¹⁵ "The Habsburg never again." Vgl. Michael, Karl. London, 1943.

simply as a family-entail and quotes a rather unbridled statement by Metternich as a sort of reference. The prevailing difficulties are caused by the interrelation of family-destiny and state-destiny, since so far as the Habsburg monarchy is concerned, family and state are identical. The problems are not those of a One-Nation State, but those of a supernational structure, whose rulers in their awareness of historical facts preserved the historical borderlines of the different provinces which bear no relation to the ethnical grouping of the population. We mention only the ceaseless linguistic quarrels of Bohemia. On the other hand, a glance at the map suffices to show that these borderlines in many instances coincide with the natural and economic frontiers of the ethnically mixed regions. It is understandable that the ruling house, which had stimulated the settlement of population groups of differing origins in these provinces and which was in a way responsible for the aforementioned conditions, desired to be looked upon as the common symbol for all the many nations of the empire.¹⁶ The dynasty tried to find a solution for the difficult situation by creating a general, supernatural feeling for the state. Name of empire and family were taken from the oldest province: Austria. The ruler was the patrimonial proprietor of the whole. In Austrian state documents the Majesty never uses national determinations, he always speaks of "My House," "My peoples," "My armed forces," "My kingdoms and lands." The government agencies on the other hand very seldom refer to Austro-Hungarian matters or Austrian affairs; here too non-national determinations are preferred, as for instance the Most High Archhouse, the Imperial and Royal army, the Imperial-Royal governor of the kingdom of Bohemia, etc. Since the compromise of 1867, the distinction is made between the terms "Imperial and Royal" when Austro-Hungarian mutual agencies or affairs are concerned. "Imperial-Royal" is used in regard to agencies and affairs of the Western half of the empire, and the preponderantly national term "Royal Hungarian" for matters of the Eastern half. Though on a somewhat different level, the situation resembles in a way that of the United States, where

¹⁶ "An Economic Federation for the Danube Basin." Rie, Robert. *World Affairs Interpreter*, XIV:4, p. 383.

we have no adjective for the nation as such and where we have to speak of a "U. S. Army" or "American Army", for instance, the adjective of the continent being applied to a nation, which settled only the northern half of this continent and not even the biggest area. Canada and Brazil have a bigger area, while several Latin-American countries also call themselves "United States", as for instance -of Brazil, -of Venezuela and so forth.

Originally the Habsburgs were Swiss Alemans, which is of characterological importance. The first king Rudolph had married a countess Gertrud von Zollern-Hohenberg, a cognate of the later Brandenburgian and Prussian house. Going even further back one discovers that the family of the counts of Habsburg comes from upper Alsace, the neighbor country of Lorraine, one of whose later dukes was to marry Maria Theresa. Lorraine is a genuinely international country situated "inter duas nationes", namely between Germany and France.¹⁷ Since so much has been written about the elements of degeneration in the Habsburg blood mixture, it seems almost imperative to mention some positive, constructive points. Southwestern Germany and Switzerland, the Swabians and Alemans, gave great men to the world and contributed a great deal to European education. The Swabians always have been praised or, according to circumstances, reprimanded for their innate trend toward "Weltbürgertum", i.e. their cosmopolitan inclination. The Swabian "Südwestecke" (Southwestern corner) of Germany was always a place of intellectual unrest. Even if one is not influenced by the somewhat servile attitude of old Austrian history-textbooks, the figure of Rudolph is attractive on account of his sound simplicity and his unpretentious sense for good administration. This last quality, which he had proved long before his election, was the decisive cause for Rudolph's ascension to the throne. He, and not his distant scion Friedrich III, is the actual founder of the marriage-policy, which eventually inspired the verse: "Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube!"¹⁸

The first apparently non-eugenetic marriage was that of Maximilian I and Maria of Burgundy, the heiress of Charles the

¹⁷ Bischoffshausen, *ibid.*, 14.

¹⁸ Schiller, "Der Graf v. Habsburg (1803).

Bold.¹⁹ Now — in the 15th century — the Habsburg's marriage-policy started "par force", and the scion of this marriage, Philip the Handsome, was given as consort to the heiress of Spain, Jane the Crazy. From the viewpoint of heredity the dynasty had accepted an awful burden. Could it be considered a gain from the political viewpoint?

The answers of the different writers, called upon for judgment, are varied in the respective epochs. The fact that Spain and her possessions over sea came under the scepter of the Habsburgs may be considered as an immediate advantage for the dynasty. But Charles V, the son of Philip the Handsome and Jane the Crazy, was forced by the overwhelming magnitude of the "Hausmacht", to divide it between his son and his brother, for the "Hausmacht" had increased again by this brother Ferdinand's accession to the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia after the battle of Mohacs (1526). The imperial crown fell to Ferdinand, who thus became the founder of the junior, poorer and henceforth non-Spanish line. German Protestants as well as moderate German Catholics claimed and still claim that beginning with this partition Spain assumed the education of the Habsburgs in a Catholic, counter-reformatory way. And, indeed, all the Habsburg emperors from Ferdinand I to Charles VI, with the exception of the allegedly secret Protestant Maximilian II and the liberal Joseph I, the granduncle of the famous Joseph II, looked with fascination towards Spain.²⁰

Finally we have to deal with the most serious reproach: the claims of the younger line for the throne of Spain led to the war of the Spanish succession, which caused a twofold loss for the Austrians in spite of many a victory. The incorporation of Belgium, which was lost again at the end of the same century, did not compensate for the transfer of Spain and her oversea-posessions to the Bourbons. And the sacrifices in blood and money weakened Austria, which was still suffering from the aftermath of the war against the Turks. Considering this very special European and Austrian situation, the question arises, whether Habsburg's part-

¹⁹ Brief Max I. vom Dezember 1477 an Sigmund Pruschenk v. Hardegg.

²⁰ Cf. "Das österreichische Staatsrechtsproblem," Redlich, Joseph. Leipzig 1920, I, 25-37.

ners in this European game had been so much "better." In the East, Austria had to fight the Turks. The Western rival was Louis XIV, whose grandsons and great-grandsons eventually would rule Spain no more liberally or with less corruption than the elder line of Habsburg had done. It was indeed Queen Anne's and Marlborough's, — i.e. a Protestant, postrevolutionary — England, that backed the Habsburgs against France, preferring Austria's world-power to Bourbon's preponderance.

In a further attempt to justify the policy of Leopold I and his more outstanding sons, Joseph I and Charles VI, we must emphasize the fact that this entire epoch was enthralled by the idea of universalism and visualized its fulfillment through centralization. The ancient ideals of Rome were still alive in the Holy Roman Empire, while the representatives of what we might call the "modern age" submitted to mercantilism as one tool for unification. Louis XIV and Peter the Great were younger, modern unifiers. And the most important minds of this time tried to influence the Habsburgs to create One Empire with One Law, which might procure a new Pax Romana for the entire earth. The crown of the Holy Roman empire should be its symbol, — and indeed functioned as such until 1806. Prince Eugene of Savoy persistently suggested this idea to Charles VI, and the Protestant philosopher Leibniz, the favorite of the Guelphic courts, had already speculated on the possibility that his Catholic emperor Leopold I should, as a new Justinian, bless the whole empire with One Law.

When we examine the counsels of eminent advisers and when we blame the eternally wavering Habsburgs for their hesitant attitude, we must not overlook the antagonistic opinions of the opponents. To those brought up within the orbit of feudal ideas, the feudal lord, i.e. the obstinate, land-owning aristocrat, must appear quite different from his appearance to us. We do not feel too sympathetic towards the aristocrat, due to the traditional prejudice of the Third Estate. Yet the average American, the typical John Doe, cannot understand why the suffering, small landowner of Hungary or Southern Italy has not yet enforced and accomplished the so urgently needed redistribution of agricul-

tural soil. The man on the Western coast of the Atlantic does not understand that the prejudice of the high classes against the low classes is fostered by a peculiar prejudice, or more correctly partiality, of the low classes toward the high classes. However, the conditions South of the Mason-Dixon line may be regarded as a — although somewhat more radical — counterpart of certain European conditions. From early childhood, the lowborn has been diligently taught a feeling of inferiority, an inhibitive class-consciousness, and at the same time a certain pride in his status and in his belonging to his class. It is, as when a cultured negro declares himself proud of his being a negro, or when people of other racial minorities pride themselves upon their race within and in spite of adverse population-majorities. However, men and women of racial minorities, who appear proud of their race, seem rather to express pride on account of their accomplishments which have found recognition in spite of racial prejudices. The transition from one class into a higher one has been often attempted, but the uncertainty of the "Newcomers" regularly led to such embarrassing situations, that the average European rather cherishes a social cleavage and acknowledges the borderlines of his own class with a conservatism, which is not always comprehensible to an American.

Of course, due to social contact the members of the Austrian dynasty were very much subject to the influence of the high aristocracy and to the "*praejudicium favorabile*" in the latter's favor. But even anti-Habsburg authors emphasize the historical fact that the rulers endeavored to do justice to the interests of the lower classes. In the era of Leopold I and of Leibniz, the emperor's treasurer Christian Julius von Schierendorff drafted a reform plan concerning 1) a statute of succession to the throne valid for all the Habsburg lands, 2) the abolition of serfdom — more than a century before Kundlich, and 3) a representative constitution for the Austrian states.²¹ Only the first part of the plan materialized, namely the statute of royal succession, the "*Sanctio Pragmatica*," which was accepted by

²¹ "Studien zur österreichischen Reichsgeschichte." Fischel A. Vienna, 1906.

all the states of the Habsburg lands under Charles VI and remained the principal law of the empire until 1918.

His daughter Maria Theresa, who succeeded him, must be regarded as the only "national Austrian," as the greatest representative of a nation, which never really existed in a national sense. The Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, who finally managed to have her consort Franz Stephan of Lorraine elected emperor of the Holy Roman empire, is the true creator of "modern" Austria as it existed until 1918. Her principles of administration and the organization of government agencies survived the monarchy and could not completely be destroyed even by Hitler's interference. This ancestress of the house of Habsburg-Lorraine, was the daughter of the remarkable Charles VI, who believed rather in the sanctity of treaties than in assuring their security by armies and who deemed the "Sanctio Pragmatica" and its recognition by the princes more promising than preventive measures of armament as proposed by his generalissimo Eugene of Savoy. The mother, the converted former Princess Elizabeth of Brunswick, came from the highly gifted Welfish house.

The last Habsburgs, who represented the Austrian male-line, inherited the Catholic enthusiasm of gloomy Ferdinand II, who had approved of Wallenstein's assassination, and who, while allowing the assassins to become rich, had ordered two thousand masses for the eternal repose of the murdered man's soul. But in them also a heritage of love for music and learning was apparent. Leopold I who was more disfigured by the notorious lower lip than all the other members of the house, was an excellent composer, Charles VI, educated in Spain, excelled by an expert mind for architecture.

Although the Austrian line never was so much tainted by inter-marriages as was the Spanish line,²² yet even the healthy

²² Charles V married his first cousin; their son Philip II married first his cousin Mary, who gave birth to Don Carlos, later his niece Anne, mother of Philip III. Philip III married his second cousin: Their son, Philip IV, married his niece, who became the mother of Charles II, the last Habsburg-king of Spain, a mentally deficient ruler.

Cf. "Mental and moral heredity in Royalty," Woods, Frederick, *The Popular Science Monthly*, August 1902-April 1903.

and health-loving Maria Theresa shows traits inherited from somber ancestors.²³ She broke down completely when she became a widow, and in her declining years spent many hours every day in the crypt of the Capuchins. When no longer able to climb the stairs on account of her age and ill health, she used an especially constructed elevator. This deportment has been called a hereditary affliction, traceable back to distant Jane the Crazy, whose necrophile peculiarities had to be taken into consideration by her son Charles V. But we have to admit that encroaching age, an environment ruled by the traditional Spanish court-etiquette, and a Catholic inclination towards the transcendent may have influenced Maria Theresa's mind more than elements of heredity.

The empress possessed a keen sense of realism in politics. During the time of her reign the burning of books and expulsions of restless minds took place. The great rococo empress and protectress of Mozart did not tolerate the famous adventurer Casanova in Vienna, but she granted an audience to the eminent Protestant Lessing, whom she hoped to gain for the Burgtheater. She created also the Austrian "Beamtenadel," i.e. a nobility based on the status of being a State's employee. This unique caste used to look upon the Danubian empire as a *nation*. She invited first the sons of the Hungarian nobility to come to Vienna, where she gave them an education in her foundation, the Theresianum. Later followed also representatives of the youth of other nationalities, adventurers, scholars and organizers. All of them had to be Catholic, and the empress "melted" them into her caste of Civil servants, who together with the army were to imprint a unified character upon the Austrian lands. Indeed, the basic idea of the empress was correct. If the executives of the central will, the officials, in spite of their absolutely different backgrounds represented the One supreme circle, namely the Crown and the court, everywhere in the Habsburg lands, a compromise was achieved, which must be considered as remarkable for those times. It is interesting to note, that,

²³ 'L'Amor de la Mort chez les Habsbourg,' Mersey, Paul-R. Paris, Ollier-Henry, 1912.

although the structure of Great Britain is entirely different, the House of Lords remodels itself by the appointments of new peers. The empress created for her own purposes a new ruling class, unlike the traditional aristocratic estates, and tied this class closely to the crown through education, gratitude and common interests.

The empress is the outstanding representative of a great house with all its manifold contradictions. A zealous Catholic, she thoroughly approved of the burning of the books, and yet talked modestly and with amusement to the great Lessing during a private audience; the kindly, motherly Viennese, who according to a textbook anecdote gave her full breasts to the poor baby of an underprivileged mother, she wrote the most disagreeable, most embarrassing letters to her daughter Marie Antoinette, the Dauphine and eventual Queen of France, who due to discrete reasons was unable to become a mother soon enough. When the Dauphine finally gave birth to a princess, the grandmother, who was one of the greatest sovereigns of all times, was deeply disappointed. She is the indignant and avengful ruler of a great power, who fought three world wars for the stolen Silesia, but eventually signed a treaty with the robber, Frederick II of Prussia, which resulted in the annexation and partitioning of Poland. She is the imperialistic politician, who organized the purloined province of Galicia to such perfection that its population very soon felt favorably inclined toward the Austrian conquerors. In the next two centuries during the era of the so-called "Polish crises" the revolutionary trends were much stronger in the Prussian and Russian territories of the former elective kingdom than in Galicia. The Austro-Polish solution of the Polish problem, i.e. the union of the Polish territories of Russia, Prussia and Austria under one crown attached to the Austrian was a favorite suggestion of the Poles during the world-war 1914/18. It did not materialize on account of Prussia's unwillingness to yield her Polish territories and of Hungary's fear, which probably was shared by Germany, that an enormous Slavic bloc from the Baltic to the Adriatic sea might gain power and further strength.

After the death of the motherly Machiavelli, Joseph II ascended the throne. He was an idealist, who united in his character traits of liberalism, centralism and, of course, of imperialism. Though he had been able to gain his mother's consent to the partition of Poland, he could not go so far as to annex Bavaria, which was culturally and geographically much nearer to his capital Vienna. Such a bold stroke would not have pleased the "fifth" and youngest of the big powers in Europe, Prussia.

Next to Maximilian II, Joseph was the most un-Catholic of the Roman emperors of his dynasty, although the universalistic idea, which was in some way a Catholic idea, inspired him. A modern jargon, taken from Hitler's technical terms in the administrative field, might call his different enterprises attempts at "Gleichschaltung" or unification. These attempts may have been too sudden and too rigorous, but the emperor was enchanted by the great ideals of his era: progress and enlightenment. He personified Austria's Great Revolution, Tier Etat, and Bonapartism, the latter to be interpreted as a kind of modern universalism, such as Napoleon propagated in order to carry the modified results of the revolution across the borders of France proper into the French empire. In his efforts to Germanize the country the emperor pursued the same aim as his great mother Maria Theresa. Neither planned the suppression of the nationalities, but they recognized German as Habsburg's imperial language, because German was the living language of the adjoining cultural sphere. There is a certain justification for calling Joseph II the Don Quixote of the Enlightenment, the knight errant of nationalism. For instance, the hallowed symbol of Hungary, the sacred crown of St. Stephen, was kept in the court treasury at Vienna purely as an exhibition piece; but he ruled that the dead should be buried only in cheap sacks for the purpose of quick decomposition. The deists appeared so ridiculously irrational to the emperor, that in one case he ordered the whipping of such a believer. And as the convicts in the end assaulted their liberator Don Quixote, so did Joseph's subjects misunderstand this remarkable Habsburg, who was so totally a Habsburg, for he only listened to and followed his inner voice. On his premature

deathbed he found himself compelled to revoke many, nay, most of his reforms.

However, the "Josephinism," the sense for a well meaning, solicitous, dutiful government, survived him as a new, important and additional characteristic trait of the Habsburg empire. Though it had to keep more or less in the background during the next epoch, it came eventually to have a strong influence in shaping the Austrian idea. It was rather unfortunate from the historical viewpoint that Joseph II's brother and successor, Leopold II, ruled only for two years (1790-1792), for he had previously distinguished himself in matters of administration as grandduke of Tuscany.

There is little to be praised in Francis II, who became Francis I of Austria in 1804. "Apathetic, cold, of slow but rather correct judgment, without special physical or mental talents, but with a head and character well-fitted for the business" — thus the great-uncle Joseph impartially and correctly describes the cold future father-in-law of Napoleon, the emperor and paternal friend of Metternich.²⁴ Closer study of Francis' life and character reveals that he had only one friend, the court- and state-chancellor Metternich, and that he had only one government system, i.e., the system, Metternich's system. Today, Metternich and Francis are judged somewhat more leniently because of three items on the positive side of their account, which may outweigh the many horrible negative items, amongst which a persecution of the Protestants in Tyrol under Francis' idiotic son, Ferdinand, must be listed. These positive points are: 1) an enormous territorial gain for Austria after the losses from the Napoleonic wars; 2) a huge increase of Austria's international authority whose emperor had become more highly respected than the last Holy Roman emperors; and 3) a comparatively long period of peace following the signing of the Vienna Congress acts.

The Congress which offered Austria a great opportunity inaugurated also the system of the ill-famed omissions, which would finally lead to the fall of the monarchy.

²⁴ "Metternich," Srbik, Heinrich v. Munich 1925, vol. 1, 443.

When Francis in 1835, was succeeded by his mentally deficient son Ferdinand as a shadow-emperor, Metternich still remained at the helm. As the aging prince grew more pious, the Catholic camarilla of the Jesuits and the "State Conference", presided over by archduke Ludwig, and the gifted, ultramontane archduchess Sophia, mother of young Francis Joseph and sister of the Prussian crown-princess Elizabeth, governed the empire and tried to govern Europe as well.

Metternich's great omissions are: 1) in the sphere of foreign politics he did not utilize the advantageous position Austria held as guardian and keeper of Napoleon's son. By appointing the "Aiglon" king of Greece, he could have been eliminated as a danger for France. Or Austria allying herself with Bonapartism could have installed the son, raised and educated in Austria, upon the throne of his father. In fact, this would have met the wishes of French patriots. There is really no vindication for Austria's rigidity and firmness of character in upholding her principles, for the "system" finally was obliged to recognize the consequences of the "July-Revolution" in France as well as in Belgium.

2) The "system" did nothing to bring the German movement for liberalism and unity under Austria's sceptre, which would have been in accordance with the wishes of German patriots. Thus Prussia in advance would have been denied the most important stimulus for her growth, the German crown.

3) The chronic Austrian omission: No attempt was made to reorganize the Danube basin. The many nationalities of the monarchy were kept in ignorance and without education, while particular care was taken to prevent their having any knowledge of each other. By fighting every moderate nationalistic tendency the "system" unintentionally promoted the growth of radical nationalistic trends, from which Francis Joseph's era was to suffer. The most excessive among them, the radical German nationalism in the German lands of Austria—eventually called "National socialism"—was to become the scourge of a world, which had refused to understand the problems of the Danubian basin.

It is impossible to deal with the era of Francis Joseph, the successor of Ferdinand and of the "system", in a few pages. Many attempts have been made to portray his character, but he himself probably did it best, interestingly enough, during a conversation with his unbiased, but deeply impressed guest Theodore Roosevelt: "Looking at me you see the last monarch of the old school!" The remark, that the name Francis and Joseph already explained his character, is not entirely incorrect. A sense of duty, pessimism, and personal simplicity, an immeasurable dynastic pride coupled with personal modesty, an immense understanding of the complications of the Spanish court-etiquette and a touching devotion for the charming Katharina Schratt, who made only the most favorable use of the peculiar position she acquired at the imperial court in Francis Joseph's later years about the time of crownprince Rudolph's tragic death in 1889 — these characteristic traits stamp the old emperor as a figure worthy of only one great novelist of our days, Thomas Mann.

III.

Francis Joseph's era is memorable not only because of its extraordinary length, but also because of the manifold changes and developments which took place. In those 68 years — which coincided with the Darwinian epoch —, the Habsburg empire passed through all conceivable phases of development in accordance with changing state-theories. Francis Joseph's ascension to the throne resulted from the revolution in 1848, but it was also, it may be even more, due to a court intrigue. The revolution was followed by brutal reaction, an interventionistic campaign of Tsar Nicolas I against the rebellious Hungarians, after which the Russian autocrat had to intervene against the Austrian "bloody assizes" of Haynau. Indescribable hatred abroad against the régime²⁵ followed the well-meaning absolutism of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg and Dr. Alexander Bach, the first great ministers of the young emperor. Much progress has to be listed, for the new régime rather favored

²⁵ "Die Habsburger," Rapp, Alfred. Stuttgart 1936, Franckh Verlag.

"The Austrian Court in the 19th Century," Rumbold, Sir Horace. London,

"The Crimes of the House of Habsburg against its own liege subjects," 1909, Methuen.

Newman, F. W. London 1853, John Chapman.

technical innovations which had, in the time preceding 1848, encountered only distrust. Austria, keeping an eye on liberalism and the Western powers and thereby antagonizing Russia, began to emphasize again her rôle of supremacy within Germany. After the catastrophe of 1866 the emperor committed the great mistake, which, although it saved his government for the time being, finally led the monarchy into disaster. The "Ausgleich" or compromise, reached with Hungary, degraded the great federal Commonwealth-idea, the probable salvation of the Habsburg realm and of Europe, to a caricature. Instead of granting equal rights to all the nationalities, Vienna compromised with the Hungarians only and granted them the ruthlessly exploited hegemony over the many non-Magyars, who were living within the Hungarian half of the empire. The heavy territorial losses, which Francis Joseph had suffered until 1867, had induced him to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the European powers had sanctioned this occupation at the Congress of Berlin (1878), the final annexation of the lands as a sort of colony for both halves of the empire in 1908 met critical opposition. Here is again one of the many halfhearted measures. If the emperor, in spite of the probably frantic resistance on Hungary's part, had united the new territory with the other South-Slavic lands of both halves into a great Yugoslavic realm, Serbia would probably have joined the old monarchy. Thus might have been avoided a Yugoslav, Serbophile irredenta, which aimed at separation of the South-Slavic lands from the monarchy and led, indeed, to the first world war.

Francis Joseph's rule is but one chain of evidences that appeasement and compromises may gain momentary peace, but finally end in a much bloodier catastrophe than the temporarily avoided conflict would have been. Whenever the emperor ventured a total instead of a half measure, he succeeded, as for instance when he set his royal signature under the bill granting general and equal elections to the Austrian half of his empire. The social democrats returned to the Reichstat, strengthened as had been predicted, but also much more loyal; and it was exactly in their club-sessions that serious plans for a reform of the whole dual monarchy were considered. Each reform, however, was bound to change the dual

system itself, and the emperor, unfortunately, considered the hybrid structure of his empire the masterwork of his life.

His successor, Charles, the last ruling Habsburg, inherited a world war, a split-up empire and Slavic governments-in-exile, which had found shelter within the orbit of the "entente." The latter were in reality only stepchildren of that fatal dualism, representatives of those nations, which sometimes in Austria had been allowed to take the floor and to influence government actions in Austria, but never, in Hungary. Nowhere, however, had they gained their national rights, i.e. true equality.

It does not matter, whether Germany is dismembered and partitioned after the second world war, for world history will repeat itself disastrously, if the re-liberated successor states of the former monarchy in complete independence should pursue an "independent" policy, which would result finally in mutual weakening because of economic competition and political rivalry. This region, wedged as it is in between a strong Russia and a possibly again recovering Germany, must be expected to develop into a volcanic source of unrest in Eastern Central Europe. As we know, the successor states were never ethnically pure, but, at least in vast regions, always mixed, which means that every state had been exposed to its neighbor's irredenta particularly during the era from 1919 till 1939.

The problem of the United States of Europe has not yet been solved. But why should it not be possible to reunite on a new basis what was once united?

We dare a bold statement: If the United States had lost the War of the Revolution, they would be today just as independent, just as big and just as influential as they now are — or perhaps even more so — at least within the British Commonwealth of nations and as a dominion of the British crown. The Czech people would have influence in a federal Danube monarchy, because their proposals would probably be regarded as the opinion of a big power and as such would have a better chance of being heard by the world than the demands of a small independent nation somewhere in a corner of the Central European East.

We dare a second statement: Caesar erred when he thought it better to be the first one in a Spanish village than the second one in Rome. The one, who is second in Rome, has a better chance to become the first one in the world than any village dictator.

Whether or not Europe will become united, there can be no doubt that the successor states of the former Danube monarchy will find themselves forced to form an economic alliance or perhaps an economic federation. Which form will be chosen will depend upon demands for a looser or tighter link in the Danube valley. It is therefore beyond doubt that a political association would greatly aid an economic one.

It was particularly unfortunate for Francis Joseph that his government never returned to the excellent constitutional draft, which doubtless would have meant a solution of the problems within the Danube space. It was, however, drowned in the counter-attack of the feudal and German-nationalistic groups. The Reichstag, which was summoned at first to meet in Vienna, but had to move later to the Moravian town of Kremsier, occupied itself with the deliberation of the so-called "Kremsier draft of a constitution (Kremsierer Verfassungsentwurf) of December 21, 1848". Paragraphs 21 and 113 of this draft developed principles and technical ideas, which could have made the monarchy the model for every multinational world-empire and of the League of Nations.²⁸

This draft of a constitution perished in the counter-revolution of 1849; two other constitutional experiments, which the more mature Francis Joseph ventured, also enjoyed only a very short life. The October Diploma of 1860, which broke away from all tendencies toward Germanization and attempted to tie the national groups of the feudal aristocracy together, lasted — although issued "for times eternal" — exactly until February of the following year, when Schmerling tried to secure German supremacy by the device

²⁸ § 21: "All the nations within the empire enjoy equality of their rights. Each nation has its inviolable right to preserve and exercise its national culture and language. The equality of all languages, used by the nations of the empire, in school, office and public life is guaranteed."

§ 113: "Provinces with nationally mixed population will make provisions to establish a constitutional agency which will decide in matters of purely ethnical character according to equity."

of a most complicated indirect election-system of the dietcuries to the Reichsrat. This system lasted till the debacle of 1866.

All the constitutional experiments, which Francis Joseph undertook, came to nothing, for the dual monarchy, whose main experiment had been dualism perished in 1918, before the belated reform attempts of Emperor Charles and Lammasch could even begin to take effect. The successor states, however, burdened with the heritage of the problems of the old monarchy because of their ethnical mixtures, are also German satellites, who await liberation by the Allies. Their reintegration in the sense of the peace treaties of Versailles, St. Germain and Trianon would only repeat the horrible game in not too distant a time.

It sounds like a leitmotiv played by different instruments in the different phases of the Habsburg drama, the demand for one great empire situated between Germany and Russia, externally powerful, centralized perhaps in certain branches of legislature and jurisdiction, of commerce and of financial administration, in problems of defense and foreign policy, but otherwise federative. The German Bohemian Schierendorff, the deputies of the Kremsier Reichstag, the Slavophile Palacky, Masaryk's teacher,²⁷ the brilliant independent thinker Adolph Fischhof, archduke-successor Francis Ferdinand,²⁸ and the last Habsburg emperor Charles — they all understood and visualized that the only possible solution must be a compromise, between not only the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary, but between all the nations of the Danube basin, a union based on mutual tolerance for the strengthening of the whole empire.

The house of Habsburg regarded itself as essentially Catholic, and it has been blamed as well as praised for its religious zeal. However, great Catholic teachers emphasize the divine origin of the

²⁷ Franz Palacky in 1848: "If the Austrian empire had not existed during past centuries, it ought to have been created in the very interest of Europe and of humanity."

Cf. "Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg," Fischel, Dr. Alfred. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919, p. 254.

²⁸ Cf. "Kaiser Karl," Poltzer-Hoditz, Arthur.

idea of the League of Nations²⁹ and, remarkably enough, the permissibility of the revolution against tyrants.³⁰

The question arises: How could one find the way back to the old monarchy and at the same time forward to a new federation in Central Europe? "No states can be founded with logical formalism . . ." ³¹ The answer is: through recognition of necessity and by clearly defined resolution of the nation or of the nations concerned. These points had served as an argument for the defense of Orléanism, which lasted for 18 years in France as the so-called July monarchy and survived much longer in Belgium and other constitutional monarchies.³²

The Habsburgs and the Austrian Germans as well as the other Danubian nations will cease to be a problem and a threat to the peace of Europe, when they finally come to understand that it is much better to gather around one banner as free nations "than to suppress the conquered or neglected".³³

The nations of Central Europe should never forget that because of the importance of their living space, each conflict there might result in global conflict and new bloodshed for far distant peoples. Let us hope that they will prove worthy of the preeminent situation and create a lasting organization in the interest of world peace!

"Unser menschliches Jahrhundert herbeizuführen . . ." (To bring about our humanitarian century —) thus the great Schiller defines the purpose of the efforts of all the preceding ages.³⁴

²⁹ "Supplément à l'examen de conscience," Fénelon, Oe. VII, 101.

³⁰ "Summa theologica," St. Thomas ab Aquinis. 2, 2, Qo. 42, art. 2.

³¹ "Die Wandlungen der österreichisch-ungarischen Reichsidee," Tezner, Friedrich. Vienna, 1905. Manz. 49.

³² "Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de mon temps," Guizot. II, 24.

³³ Fischhof, Adolph. *Ibid.*, 29.

³⁴ "Was heisst un zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte," Schiller, Friedrich. A lecture.

Wanted: Teachers of English

Foreign Countries

JAMES PAUL STOAKES

The victory of the United Nations will open an unparalleled opportunity for teachers of English. Already English is the dominant language of the world from the commercial and cultural points of view, and, at the end of the war, it will become the dominant language from the political point of view as well. The postwar association of the two great English-speaking nations with Russia and China will inevitably produce in those countries an accelerated demand for English, a demand that will be reflected from every corner of the world. Ten years' experience with the Good Neighbor policy as formulated by President Roosevelt has given some indication of what the entrance of the United States upon the international scene means to English teachers. The twenty-one cultural institutes established in Latin America by the Department of State and the Office of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs could be multiplied tenfold and still would not meet the demand. The main activity in these institutes is teaching English. What is going to happen when peace comes and the inevitable world-wide demand for English makes itself felt? Where will the teachers come from? Will the teaching be left to the professional teachers of foreign languages? Or will English teachers recognize that teaching English as a foreign language is a legitimate, fascinating, and incredibly important branch of their profession and prepare themselves accordingly?

The field has been largely neglected. One can go from an undergraduate major in English to the doctorate without ever hearing a reference to the problems that English presents to the foreigner. Perhaps the neglect has been due to the feeling that the matter is not important, that anyone who speaks English can teach it to a foreigner — as if any who breathes can explain the chemistry of the atmosphere. Perhaps it has been felt, also, that professional opportunities were limited to night classes for immigrants in large cities.

Anyone who has ever tried to learn a foreign language from a native speaker unexperienced in teaching it knows how false the first point of view is: the would-be instructor probably had no idea of what to teach or how to teach it. As for the second notion, that there are only limited opportunities for teaching English as a foreign language, however true it may once have been, it is now, as far as Latin America is concerned, utterly false; and, with the coming of peace, it will be false as far as most of the world is concerned.

Consider the situation today in South America. Every professional student in a university is compelled to rely on foreign-language textbooks — formerly mostly French but increasingly English. This is true in the fields of medicine, engineering, pharmacy, and, to a lesser extent, in law; in architecture, dentistry, music, and art. Aside from the professions, the ordinary clerk or stenographer can get a better position at a better salary if he knows English. The "want-ad" sections of South American newspapers clamor constantly for English-speaking employees. It is not unusual, for example, for *El Tiempo* of Bogota to carry on its front page three different advertisements asking for English-speaking employees. Besides these professional and commercial reasons for knowing English, there are the cultural reasons. The American way of life, American literature, art, music, philosophy, science — in short, the United States of America, everything it is and everything it aspires to be — has for South Americans a forthright, unappeasable interest. American books on any subject are the preferred sources of information, the preferred authorities. To go to the United States, at least for a visit, is every Latin American's dream; to have been there, even for a visit, is his passport to cultural and social prestige; to have studied there, for however short a time, is an almost infallible guaranty of professional success.

The present status of English in Latin America will almost certainly, within a few years, be the status of English in the entire world. Its political position, already a fortunate one, will be immeasurably strengthened by the victory of the United Nations. Not only is English the official language of the United

States; it is the official speech of the British Empire, which includes 430 million speakers of other tongues. It is spoken as a native language by 200 million persons — more than one-tenth of the human race — and as a second language by millions more. It is the language of government and administration of one-third of mankind. Only Chinese exceeds English in the number of native speakers; and Chinese, though it is one written language, is two spoken languages, each with numerous dialects. Extremely difficult for foreigners to learn, Chinese offers no competition to English on the international scene. If some sort of world order emerges from the present condition of things, English will be the international medium of that order.

II

How well prepared are English teachers to contribute to the spread of English in foreign lands? How much do they know about the nature and peculiarities of English as seen by foreign eyes? How much of the special technique required for teaching a foreign language do they possess?

Here is what a British scholar says on these points (and the British have been sending teachers abroad far longer than we have):

The problem of teaching our tongue to foreigners who wish to learn it by study is one that has never been approached properly, and one which it is in our national interest to solve. Hitherto such teaching has been left to unco-ordinated private initiative. There is no system of sending abroad and to the colonies English specialists technically equipped to teach English to those to whom it is a foreign tongue, and to demonstrate the right methods of teaching . . .

The result of our remissness is that, although a certain amount of interesting and valuable pioneer work is being done by persons working independently, there is much need for improvement in the methods of teaching English to foreigners. Teachers who are not well acquainted with English but who are employed because they can speak the tongue of those whom they teach; or who know English only and are ignorant of the difficulties it presents, which vary according to the nationality of the pupils; or who are innocent of phonetic knowledge; or who spend their time endeavoring to instil the ancient and obsolete principles derived from Latin grammar under the delusion that they are explaining the structure of modern English — all these can produce untold confusion and discouragement in the minds of their students, and do untold harm to a cause whose greatness may be realized too late.*

* J. Hubert Jagger, *English in the Future*, 138-39. London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1940.

Dr. Jagger's words are as applicable to the United States as to England. Perhaps there is more excuse in our case, for at least the United States has never been an empire with over 400 million speakers of other tongues than English under its tutelage; but there can be no excuse for neglecting the problem any longer. Present and future teachers of English must interest themselves in this aspect of their profession. Adequate textbooks must be written, graded readings edited, efficient techniques of instruction developed — in short, the problem of teaching English as a foreign language must be defined and steps taken toward its solution, from both the linguistic and the pedagogical points of view.

The lack of satisfactory textbooks for teaching English to foreigners is nothing short of amazing. The bookstores of Bogota, "the Athens of South America," stock, and apparently sell, a textbook that first appeared in 1851 and another that, according to the current issue, is in its one hundred and twentieth edition. Both of these volumes, and dozens of others, are characterized by the "hast-thou-seen-Mary" brand of English, and they labor under the handicap of having been written by foreigners with an imperfect feeling for the language and of being formidable and cumbersome in presentation. The government's Latin-American cultural institutes, faced with the necessity of teaching English without textbooks, have mostly improvised their materials, sometimes distributing them in mimeographed form, sometimes printing them in cheap pamphlet form. Hastily and superficially prepared, usually by teachers without professional training in English, they abound in errors instantly obvious to the expert, but unhappily, not at all obvious to the students who use them. The result is time wasted in misrepresenting the facts, in emphasizing the unimportant, in lingering over the obvious. The number of hours of wasted labor spent in English study by students in other countries must annually reach astronomical proportions.

There exist excellent opportunities for the production of textbooks designed to teach English to foreigners. The writing of textbooks, however, like the teaching of English, should be under-

taken by persons with professional training in English. Both the Division of Cultural Cooperation of the Department of State and the Office of the Co-ordination of Inter-American Affairs are said to have projects under way for the production of textbooks, but there are strong reasons for believing that the projects will be slow in producing results. Even if two such government agencies as these should assemble a corps of experts, and even if these experts should be primarily expert in English rather than in Spanish or French, and even if this slightly fantastic method should succeed in producing a really good textbook or series of textbooks, there would still be abundant room for private initiative. No one textbook can possibly be completely acceptable to the eighteen nations of Spanish-speaking Latin America, each of them intensely nationalistic. Furthermore, even within a limited area, as American experience with textbooks amply demonstrates, there is room for novelty and variety.

III

What kind of special training does the English teacher need in order to redirect his professional equipment to the problem of teaching English to foreigners? First of all, he needs at least an elementary knowledge of phonetics, especially of the mechanics of sound production. He should understand the basic intonation patterns of English speech. He should have some acquaintance with word-frequency counts and their results. In addition to his knowledge of conventional English grammar, he should thoroughly understand which grammatical constructions perplex foreigners. From the pedagogical point of view, it would be well if he had an opportunity to examine a number of textbooks designed to teach English as a foreign language and to discuss with experienced teachers the actual classroom technique.

At this point the question may be asked: What about the need of knowing the language native to the student? The advantages of such knowledge are obvious. It establishes from the beginning a two-way communication between teacher and student. The student can ask questions, and the teacher can answer them in the language common to both. Points needing explanation can

be rapidly and accurately dealt with. Knowledge of the student's language enables the teacher better to understand the student's difficulties. It makes possible a combination of the deductive with the inductive approach.

However, there are drawbacks when the teacher speaks the student's language. For one thing, the teacher, eager to achieve complete communication, is likely to use the student's language too much. It is easier to do so. Learning a foreign language, however, is almost entirely a matter of hearing it and speaking it, reading it and writing it. To the average person grammatical principles mean little. They may establish a pattern, but facility in interpreting and using the pattern comes only through interpreting and using it. The teacher of a foreign language finds it difficult to restrict himself to the language that he is teaching — perhaps in a different way as difficult for him as for the student — but there is much to be said for such restriction. Even when the student does not grasp quite all that is said, his ear is being trained to recognize the individual sounds and the intonation-melody of the phrase. Such experience has for the beginner in a foreign language the same importance that listening to music has for a child learning his scales. Neither learner is prepared to grasp the full import of the complex marvel presented to him, but it may stir him and shape him just the same. Without such experience we should have neither musicians nor linguists.

It may be that many English teachers, especially those already established, will feel that devoting themselves to teaching the elements of the language to foreigners holds little appeal in comparison with the joys of expounding the greatest literature in the world. In a sense they are right; but the opportunities in the foreign-language field lie on two levels. Careerists are needed, certainly — men and women thoroughly trained in English, who will devote themselves wholeheartedly to teaching English as a foreign language; to producing in a sane, critical atmosphere the needed materials; to training their fellows in the techniques and the devices which they find most effective. In addition to the specialist scholars, an army of teachers must be mobilized from the profession at large to serve for two years or three;

if no more, in teaching English as a foreign language to the millions who wish to learn it, from Monterrey to Santiago and from Moscow to Chungking. After such experience these teachers will return to their native land spiritually enriched; their native literary culture more vividly realized; their philosophy deepened, internationalized. While they are abroad, they will have the satisfaction of knowing that they are assisting in the most humane of all enterprises, that of giving to man a means of communicating his thoughts and sentiments to his fellows of other races and colors and creeds. There will never be one world until there is one language in which the sensitive and gifted of whatever clime can meet on a common intellectual and spiritual ground. The humanities have never been isolationists.

Book Reviews

EDITED BY G. LOWELL FIELD

Autobiography of John Stuart Mill. (New York: Columbia University Press, reissued 1944, pp. vi, 240.)

The manuscript of the *Autobiography of John Stuart Mill* was acquired by the Columbia University Library through the efforts of the late Professor John Jacob Coss. It was first published in 1924 with a preface by Professor Coss in which he says that

"Mill's autobiography shows, as few books can, the growth of a man in the midst of his age. In many ways it is primarily an account of the social history of England in the first three quarters of the Nineteenth Century. Yet it is the personal though dispassionate story of the conflict of an integrated spirit with ideas and with the affairs of men. One sees an age, and one sees a man; and both man and age are so a part of our own day that by knowing them we learn to know ourselves."

The 1944 issue is in memory of Professor Coss. It contains the preface of 1924 and also a brief note by The John Jacob Coss Fellowship, in memory of their distinguished teacher who "sought to develop their effective understanding by showing the philosophical implications of problems in contemporary civilization" and "chiefly because of their recollection of his use of the text (*The Autobiography*) in his instruction of students and conversation with them, some of these students are happy to record their memories in this brief note."

The autobiography has its setting in the nineteenth century, and yet there are many gems in this little book that are as significant to us today as they were to the author. I quote a few of just such passages that have interested the reviewer. The first three chapters are an exposition of Mill's early education which he says was

"unusual and remarkable, and which, whatever else it may have done, has proved how much more than is commonly supposed may be taught and well taught, in those early years which, in the common modes of what is called instruction, are little better than wasted."

It was unusual because all formal instruction was meted out by his father James Mill, an author and conversationalist of considerable distinction in his day. Another unique feature of this early education was the complete absence of religious indoctrination; this is especially interesting in view of the fact his father was a licensed minister. Finally it is implied in the statement above that a certain amount of dissatisfaction prevailed, at least among intellectuals such as Mill, toward the educational system of the period. This issue is as provocative today as it was in nineteenth century England.

Mill says in one of the early chapters that he recalls his father's indignation at his use of the "common" (probably just as common today as then) expression "that something was true in theory but required correction in practice . . ." A statement such as this might easily be the subject of a two-hour seminar in economic theory.

On the technique of writing Mill says that all of his books were written

"at least twice over; a first draft of the entire work was completed to the very end of the subject, then the whole begun again *de novo*; but incorporating, in the second writing, all sentences and parts of sentences of the old draft which appeared as suitable to my purpose as anything which I could write in lieu of them."

The great advantage of this "double redaction," he says, is that

"It combines better than any other mode of composition, the freshness and vigour of the first conception, with the superior precision and completeness resulting from prolonged thought . . . The only thing which I am careful, in the first draft, to make as perfect as I am able, is the arrangement. If that is bad, the whole thread on which the ideas string themselves becomes twisted; thoughts placed in a wrong connexion are not expounded in a manner that suits the right, and a first draft with this original vice is next to useless as a foundation for the final treatment."

He expressed surprise at the fact that his *System of Logic* was adopted by many of the universities, especially in view of the fact that he himself was not a "university man." He added that it was probably because his *Logic* supplied a doctrine opposite to the prevailing *a priori* view of human knowledge. His was a doctrine that all human knowledge is derived from experience.

"The notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, independently of observation and experience, is, I am persuaded, in these times, the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of which the origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by reason, and is erected into its own all-sufficient voucher and justification."

This is what was called the "German, or *a priori* view of human knowledge." If Mill were alive today, he would have witnessed, in Germany and Italy, the institutional effects of such intuitive conceptions of human knowledge. The writings and speeches of Mussolini and Hitler were unsuppressed confessions of *a priori* authority, a dignified term for "usurpation" of authority.

His *Principles of Political Economy* was published in 1848, five years after his *Logic*, and was an immediate success also because

"it was not a book merely of abstract science but also of application, and treated Political Economy not as a thing by itself, but as a fragment of a greater whole; a branch of Social Philosophy, so interlinked with all the other branches, that its conclusions, even in its own peculiar province, are only true conditionally, subject to interference and counteraction from causes not directly within its scope."

University of Texas

L. K. BRANDT

Heberle, Rudolf, *From Democracy to Nazism, a Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany*. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1945, pp. ix, 130, \$2.50.)

By an intensive local history of rural politics in Schleswig-Holstein and by statistical analyses of the rural voting in that area Heberle has contributed much to the theory of political movements and particularly to the theory of the development of fascist movements.

It appears that areas of predominantly family owned and worked farms, before World War I outstandingly liberal in political attitude, were the most completely inundated in the rise of Nazi sentiment from 1928 to 1932. These populations, occupying areas distinctly backward in social evolution, were, because of their own relative social homogeneity and their previous lack of participation in organized political movements, inclined to accept a "romantic conception of state and society." Pressed from their traditional liberal moorings by the burdens of the war economy and later by adverse market and credit conditions, these small farmers swung first into local agrarian debtor movements and finally overwhelmingly into the Nazi camp.

"The classes of *Keinbuenger* and *Kleinbauern*, both survivals of the pre-capitalistic age and both in process of social decomposition, were ideologically opposed to capitalism but also to the proletarian labor movement. Many among them saw in the Hitler movement the promise of a new community-of-the-people in which class differences would be minimized but private property of land and capital preserved."

Paralysed in political acumen by memories of their own anachronistic past, members of these classes were less able than others to see the essential spuriousness of the "community" and egalitarian aspects of the Nazi creed and more ready to disbelieve in the seriousness of the centralizing and autocratic features so obvious to others in the behavior of the same movement. To them perhaps the latter appeared as the "romantic" decoration. This study gives clarification to the psychological mechanism of the Nazi appeal to the *Volk* concept, or ethnic community.

Persons still exist in modern industrialized society who have experienced something in the nature of Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft* and who, therefore, believe it a practical goal for deliberate, immediate political attainment.

In areas covered by the study characterized by pronounced social stratification — the hilly estate area of the Baltic Coast and to a lesser extent the area of specialized farming in the Western marshes — both the socialistic parties and the avowedly conservative parties maintained a fairly consistent following throughout the twenties, and even in 1930 and 1932 yielded up relatively few followers to the Nazis as compared with the liberal groups, which in these areas very nearly passed over to the Nazis *en masse* in the last two elections. In the middle area of small family farms, on the other hand, where the liberals at the beginning dominated the political picture, the closely knit communities seem to have been won over as units, and by the end of the period the Nazi vote was nearly unanimous in many of them.

University of Texas

G. LOWELL FIELD

Montagu, M. F. Ashley, *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945, 2nd ed. pp. xvi, 304. \$3.25.)

An unbiased book dealing with the topic of race is still to be written, as far as I am aware. But in these times which are so out of joint, that blessed day seems farther off than ever. Meanwhile, this is one of the better books on the subject. In his analysis the writer usually gives a fair amount of empirical evidence for his statements, though often he is merely content to quote some "authority's" opinion. The bibliographical notes are useful for those who wish to pursue a topic further.

As used by most anthropologists, the concept of race, and the implications based upon it, are methodologically naive; indeed, the whole matter needs careful and critical examination. In this connection, one of the most valuable parts of the book is that in which the author argues for a dynamic and genetic conception of race, rather than the static and taxonomic one which tends to be current among anthropologists.

"... so-called 'racial' differences simply represent more or less temporary expressions of variations in the relative frequencies of genes in different parts of the population . . . [instead of] the all-or-none conception of 'race' as a static immutable process of fixed differences." (p. 45)

One of the new chapters contained in the second edition is, "What Is the Solution?" i.e., to the "race problem." If I am not mistaken, Dr. Montagu is an Englishman, and it is amusing to see that he has been sufficiently acculturated during his stay in the United States to have adopted the customary American catholicism — education.

"... our only hope lies in education of the right sort. If we can succeed in reorganizing our system of education from top to bottom, making our principal purpose the cultivation of human beings living in one great cooperative enterprise with other human beings . . . I am confident that one of the most effective steps will have been taken toward the dissolution of the 'race' problem, as well as many other problems from which we are at present suffering. I do not see that any other solution is feasible." (pp. 248-49)

If culture is composed of interdependent customs — and Dr. Montagu seems to accept this thesis — it would be interesting to know how he proposes to reorganize the entire educational system without previously, or at least simultaneously, changing a good deal of the rest of our culture, particularly its economy, polity, and social organization. He dumps the whole problem in the lap of the educator. But, curiously enough, he nowhere states how — in these parts of the country where ethnic conflict is serious enough to matter — the educator is to arrange to remain such if he were even to preach what Dr. Montagu writes, let alone practice it.

University of Texas

J. S. SLOTKIN

Shields, H. G. and Wilson, W. Harmon, *Consumer Economic Problems*. (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Company, 1945, pp. vii, 760.)

This third edition of *Consumer Economic Problems*, an outgrowth of two previous editions that have been widely used as texts in consumer economic education in secondary schools during the past decade, will probably continue to be found useful as a text and reference by teachers in that field. The authors have made the material of the book comprehensive enough to fit almost every course of study that emphasizes the field of consumer education.

The writers have pointed out that under our economic system we have become efficient producers, but poor consumers. Their main objectives, therefore, are to train the student to determine a well-balanced spending program, to get the most value and the greatest satisfaction out of expenditures for necessities and

luxuries, and to strive toward the achievement of a higher standard of living in a democracy. The material is so arranged that applied economics, general and specific principles, and financial, legal, and personal problems are woven together into an integrated functional pattern.

Nevertheless, the book has certain shortcomings. In chapter nineteen the authors state that, "The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the problems relative to drugs, cosmetics, soaps, and dentifrices on the basis of available facts and from an enlightened point of view." One might wonder what other point of view could legitimately be given in a text on consumer economic problems. The descriptions and analyses in various parts of the book are of a somewhat cursory nature. Part three, which deals with selection and choice making, does not supply adequate background for the presentation of specific buying techniques in part four. In part nine the authors present a rather superficial description of the overall economic problems of the consumer.

Many types of illustrations such as photographs, artist's sketches, and diagrams are used effectively throughout the book. Each chapter of the book is followed by two types of questions and problems, i.e., those designed to test the knowledge of the facts given in the text and those intended to provoke thoughtful discussion and investigation. The book has very few footnotes and no bibliography. It has a good index.

University of Oklahoma

CLAUDE A. CAMPBELL

Pares, Sir Bernard, *Russia and the Peace*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944, pp. xiv, 293, \$2.50.)

This is a popular book designed to acquaint the average American reader with Russia's role in world politics and to give him a sympathetic orientation toward Russia. The book is "popular" in that it neither unearths any hitherto unpublished diplomatic correspondence nor offers a novel interpretation of Russian foreign policy. There are no footnotes or lengthy quotations from other writers to frighten away a timid reader, and Pares' frequent references to his personal experiences give the book an informal and almost fatherly tone.

The author has every right to take this fatherly tone. Now well along in his seventies and the author of half a dozen scholarly studies of Russia, Sir Bernard made his first visit to that country in 1896. He was in Russia again during the Russo-Japanese War and the great liberal movement that followed it. During World

War I, he was an official British war correspondent on the Eastern Front, and he was an eyewitness to the first years of the great revolution. This rich experience imparts a quality not found in the average book on Russia, most of which are studies of communism and begin with the revolution. The writers are either ardent communists, intense haters of communism, or disillusioned leftists whose stay in Russia has convinced them that some other "way out" must be found. By contrast Pares' long contact with Russia permits him to begin his observations with 1906 when he attended the first meeting of the Duma. Unlike other writers he is interested in Russians as people. He writes of his conversations with Litvinov and with some of the "white" emigrés with equal sympathy.

The early chapters attempt to allay common fears of Russia. He argues convincingly that world revolution is dead. He holds that the features of communism that have taken root are those that are congenial to the Russian character. Since the Russian nature is deeply religious, the drive for atheism has been a failure. Chapters on the Russian handling of her national minorities are followed by a rather extended treatment of Russian relations with Poland and the Baltic states. Pares is an historian, and he goes back ten centuries to put Russo-Polish relations in their proper perspective. More sketchy chapters tell of Russia's relations with the Balkans, the Near East, the Far East, Britain, and America.

It is no criticism of the book to note that the end of the European phase of the war and the rapid movement of events bring up numerous questions concerning Russia and the peace not covered by Pares. However, any reader of *Russia and the Peace* will be freed of many current illusions and will be convinced that Anglo-American-Russian amity and cooperation are essential to a lasting peace.

The University of Texas

DONALD S. STRONG

Paul, Leslie, *The Annihilation of Man: A Study of the Crisis in the West*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945, pp.214.)

The optimistic theme of this little book — and, despite its title, this is an optimistic book — was best stated centuries ago by one of the greatest social philosophers: "When ye shall hear of wars and rumors of wars, be ye not troubled . . . these are the beginnings of the birth-pangs." (Mark 13:8) The vision of

a new society which underlies Mr. Paul's optimism is only secondarily one of an economic and political nature; he is more concerned with man himself, with spirit, meaning, purpose — "beliefs are supreme"; "The first step in any social advance is a change of heart."

Mr. Paul, a young (42) R. A. F. officer trained in the theory and practice of music and author of several novels, here presents an analysis of the disease afflicting modern civilization as viewed by the younger generation, which is fighting this war. He seeks to correct the balance in our public thinking which largely "is done by the elderly and non-belligerent and is in consequence too often unrepresentative." His analysis, although not original or profound, is brilliant and provocative, and is based upon a good knowledge of the history of ideas. In fact, the chief contribution of this book, other than the sorely-needed optimism which it engenders, lies in its excellent summary of the intellectual history of the last one hundred years.

Mr. Paul finds, in common with the great majority of the students of cultural history, that the present world crisis is at bottom a moral crisis. The de-moralization of economics, politics, and thought, which began three hundred years ago with the triumph of science and materialism, has reached a dead-end in our present era. That science with its "progressive intellectual annihilation of the individual" has destroyed Shakespeare's "What a piece of work is man!" is supported by an examination of such principal schools of thought as utilitarianism, Darwinism, Freudianism, behaviorism, and the conclusions of modern physics. The irrationality of this world of thought, "unendurable emotionally and intellectually," is coupled with the irrationality of the world of economics and politics, "unendurable physically." Thus the rise of totalitarianism, both communist and fascist, becomes understandable: it has an attraction that is moral, economic, and political (hence the crisis of democracy which has hitherto had only a political attraction), and its absorption of the individual into an economic class or into an absolute state perfectly mirrors the annihilation of man as established by science. "Man must try to live his concept of himself."

Like Arthur Koestler, Paul sees little hope for pure Marxism as a solution for the world's material and spiritual ills; its doctrine is too filled with arid nineteenth-century materialism and inner contradictions, to be fully satisfying. But fascism presents a different story. If we do not make the common error — a product of the prevailing economic interpretation of history

—of viewing fascism as basically a capitalist counter-revolution, we can find in it a real understanding of the crisis of western civilization and, equally important, a basis for optimism. In three closely-reasoned chapters, the author describes the triumph of German fascism as the product of a romantic and idealistic reaction to the "dust and decay" of materialism. From this spiritual vacuum only the fascist way of militarism and fanaticism offered an escape, since even Christianity had been suffocated and corrupted by materialism. "Their idealism would have served another faith, *had there been one they could have believed in.*"

The author does not believe that science and materialism must be destroyed by a resurgence of faith and idealism, but rather that the long-standing divorce between them must be cancelled and the analytical approach of science with its emphasis upon means must be balanced by the creative, synthesizing way of faith with its emphasis upon ends. "Science is a way of knowing, but not the only way and not the complete way."

This is an old cry, this cry of man after a guiding principle. A century ago Mazzini uttered it in vain: "Our present duty is to found the policy of the nineteenth century; to re-ascend, through philosophy, to faith; to define and organize association; to proclaim Humanity; to initiate a new epoch." Leslie Paul believes the twentieth century will succeed where the nineteenth failed.

The University of Tulsa

NELS M. BAILKEY

Ford, James A. and Quimby, George I., Jr., *The Tchefuncte Culture, an Early Occupation of the Lower Mississippi Valley*. With an appendix on the skeletal remains by Charles E. Snow. (Menasha, Wisconsin: The Society for American Archeology and the Louisiana State University Press, supplement to *American Antiquity*, vol X, No. 3, part 2, 1945, pp. xii, 113, 12 pls., 21 figs., 18 tables, bibliography.)

In recent years, the attention of archaeologists has turned more and more toward the establishment of sound chronological frameworks within which to work out problems of cultural change. The older methods of mass collecting from areas were not, and could not be, productive of conclusions regarding trends of cultural development in societies living under variable environmental and economic conditions.

The lower Mississippi basin is among those North American regions in which progress in defining culture sequence has been

most pronounced, even though no absolute chronology has been possible beyond the historic horizon. The present authors are recognized leaders in this field. Working back from the known historic tribes (Natchez, Tunica, Choctaw, etc.), the following culture periods are now well established: Plaquemine, Coles Creek, Troyville, and Marksville. The Marksville, estimated to have existed at about 1000 to 1200 A.D., was already a rather fully developed and distinctive culture by that time, and bears affiliations with the famous Hopewell burial-mound culture centered in the Ohio valley. Now, with the definition of a Tchefuncte culture stratigraphically beneath the Marksville, this sequence is carried still farther back. The Tchefuncte, moreover, appears to contain a number of formative elements in the development of a general advancement in economic life in the Southeastern states. It represents the earliest known pottery-making culture in this region. It may be inferred from this that Tchefuncte was also the earliest agricultural society in the Southeast, although proof is lacking. Economic life must nevertheless have depended largely on sea foods, fish, and game. Further, because of its geographical position, the lower Mississippi region may possibly hold the key to the time and nature of the earliest contacts between the eastern Indians and those of Mexico and Central America.

The authors, however, have wisely refrained from indulging in any flights of fancy as to exotic origins. They have presented a model of careful description of the sites, method of excavation, and of the actual specimens found. Their methods of analysis and the interpretations which can safely be made are likewise clearly and carefully stated. Affiliations with other eastern cultures of comparable content and age (Adena, Copena, etc.) are discussed objectively and with mature judgment. The text is benefitted by numerous excavation diagrams and by consideration of factors of chance in the relative frequency of occurrence of key pottery types. Several of these types are presented in detail for the first time, and are well illustrated.

An interesting sidelight is the information (p. 10) that Tchefuncte period middens were found to depths as great as twelve feet *below* modern tide level; the inference is that the great Mississippi delta has been sinking slowly under the great weight of annual additions of silt. Since a reasonable guess for the age of Tchefuncte is *ca.* 700 to 1000 A.D., this sinking must be proceeding fairly rapidly.

The discussion of human skeletal material by Dr. Snow is equally well done, and, like the archaeological text, casts considerable new light on the human remains and cultural material

of southeastern Texas. It is to be expected that much of this Texas material, heretofore very difficult to understand, will prove to bear some affiliation with Tchefuncte.

University of Texas

ALEX D. KRIEGER

Dickson, Maxcy Robson, *The Food Front in World War I*. (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944, pp.194.)

This book is based largely on the file of materials of the United States Food Administration deposited in the National Archives at Washington, D. C., is an exposition of the critical situation of food in World War I and of the methods used in coping with the problem. As such, it is an account of the efficient work of the Food Administration under the able direction of Herbert Hoover.

In the first chapter, the author gives an account of the passage of the Food Control Bill on August 10, 1917, and sets forth Mr. Hoover's conception of the problem of food and his methods of dealing with it. The struggle over the enactment of the Food Control Bill was greatly prolonged by the opposition of a few obstructionists in Congress both on account of the charge that it was, "unconstitutional for Congress to grant any one man the authority contained in the bill," and of the opposition of some congressmen to having Mr. Hoover as Food Administrator. Mr. Hoover considered the handling of the problem of food to be a matter of "wise administration" rather than of control. He thought that the program of the Food Administration could be carried out largely through coordinating and regulating existing distributing agencies. He proposed to fill important positions with volunteers and to organize the nation for voluntary conservation of food. He emphasized the necessity of centering responsibility in a single head who was directly responsible to the President and who had power to delegate authority to decentralized organs. Such an administrative agency would be in a position to deal with problems as they originated and to take full advantage of the willingness of the American public to adapt itself to conserving food in the interest of furthering American and Allied efforts.

Chapters two to thirteen inclusive deal with the various types and techniques of propaganda used by the Food Administration to try to bring about the conservation of food. They show the use of the press, the pulpit, the rostrum, the school, and the movies and indicate the nature of the appeals made to farmers, housewives, Negroes, foreign groups, manufacturers, distributors and advertisers through these media.

Chapters fourteen to seventeen inclusive explain very briefly the methods of control employed by the Food Administration and evaluate the accomplishments of the agency.

The author concludes that although the principle of voluntary action was successfully applied on "The Food Front," in World War I, such a policy could not have been followed during World War II. In the face of *blitzkreig* and total war in a more industrialized world, a great power apparently could not have avoided recourse to rationing and price control. Certainly the excellent account of the problems and policies relative to the food situation during World War I given in this book is informative in itself and, in addition, it serves as a background for the evaluation of the problems and policies relative to the food situation in World War II.

Apparently much more space should have been given to certain parts of the book. For example, the chapters on "Methods of Control," "New Food Habits," and "Pattern for the Future" could well have been expanded. Very little attention was devoted to "The Fifty-fifty Rule" which the Food Administration established in January, 1918, directly licensing retailers dealing in flour to require every purchaser of wheat flour to buy an equal amount of corn, oats, rice, barley, or other cereal. Different conditions in various parts of the country precipitated serious problems under this directive which merited description and analysis.

Since the book is practically all based upon the Food Administration's own records, the author naturally, though perhaps unfortunately, stresses the conservation of food to a far greater degree than he does the production of food. This undue emphasis on conservation, however, can be accounted for in part by the fact that the problem of getting food produced was given to the Department of Agriculture. Nevertheless, a study purporting to deal with "The Food Front," it seems, should certainly have included adequate treatment of the problem of producing food.

University of Oklahoma

CLAUDE A. CAMPBELL

A Guide to Materials Bearing on Cultural Relations in New Mexico. Compiled by Lyle Saunders. (Inter-Americana Bibliographies, III; xviii, 528 pp. The University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1944, \$5.00.)

This bibliography is indispensable for anyone doing research in the field of the social sciences in the area of New Mexico.

Here are listed over 5,350 titles of "published and manuscript materials having some relevance to problems of cultural relations between the three main ethnic groups" (Indians, Spanish, Anglos) within the state. "Cultural relations" is used in the broadest possible sense, even including studies of archaeological excavations; of architecture; of plant and animal life; of soils, irrigation, and erosion; of mineral resources, etc. — "because we feel that it is impossible to understand any cultural group without knowing something of the physical environment in which they live, and because in New Mexico the physical environment has given direction to if not actually determined the cultural development of the Indian groups and, to a lesser extent, that of the Spanish-Americans and Anglos as well."

The core of the work is a "Dictionary-Guide" indexing under various headings (such as agriculture, assimilation, ceremonials, cost of living, etc.) the contents of 263 selected and annotated titles which the editor believes are the more important studies in cultural relations. In addition there are supplementary bibliographies grouped into eleven broad categories: Bibliographies and Indexes; Pre-Spanish Period; Apaches; Navajos; Pueblos; Indians, General; Spanish-Colonial and Mexican Periods; American Frontier Period; Spanish-American and Mexicans; Fiction and Drama; and General.

Of most usefulness are the author and subject indexes. This reviewer finds the subject index of greater service than the "Dictionary-Guide", which is but an elaborate and somewhat more detailed index of the 263 selected titles, whereas the subject index covers over 5,350 titles.

The volume is surprisingly complete and the School of Inter-American Affairs at the University of New Mexico is to be commended on sponsoring this excellent and most useful work. Research activity in the social sciences would be materially aided if similar guides were available for every state.

University of Texas

J. GILBERT McALLISTER

Adams, Ramon F., *Western Words*. (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1945, pp. xiv, 182. \$3.00.)

In saying that the "nearly 3000 words and phrases" in this work "comprise the largest vocational glossary ever compiled of the cattle business," the publisher's blurb is telling the truth. The terms are there, accurately defined and sometimes amusingly exemplified.

They are salty terms, often humorous. They will appeal to general readers. They will be pounced upon by writers of Western fiction seeking authenticity of phrase if not of life. They will be examined by students of the American language.

They have another importance in that they mirror the only significant south-north migration of a culture complex in American history. The ranch cattle industry of North America originated in the Spanish colonies, and has been dominated by Texas influence. From Mexican *rancheros* Texans borrowed their equipment and learned their techniques, modifying them from time to time to meet changing conditions. After the Civil War Texans, some as owners of herds and some as foremen or hands for Eastern or European capitalists, moved onto the great grass lands between Texas and Canada. A smaller migration from California took place along the Pacific coast.

The extent to which the industry was rooted in Spanish tradition is reflected in the language of the West. Many of the terms have been so Anglicized in spelling and pronunciation as to disguise their origin: *bronc*, *corral*, *hackamore* (from *jaquima*), *morral*, *quirt*, *ranch*, *wrangler* (from *caverango*), to mention some of the more common ones.

In some cases a divergence between the Texas and the California traditions is apparent. Texans adopted the *chaperjos* of the Mexicans but called them leather leggings. Californians shortened the term to *chaps*, which is supplanting the Texas term even in Texas. Texans appropriated *vaquero*, the Mexican equivalent of *cowboy*, but, except on the border, restricted its application to Spanish-speaking cowhands. From California the term, transformed to *buckaroo*, went to the Northwest, where it is applied to all cowhands. Thus though terminology is not uniform throughout the cattle country, all regions reflect the Spanish origin of the industry.

The University of Texas

MODY C. BOATRIGHT

BOOK NOTES

Historians, political scientists, and sociologists interested in political movements will find of especial interest the well written account of British "Tory democracy," *The Primrose League, 1883-1906*, by Janet Henderson Robb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, pp. 258, \$3.25), which throws light on the early stages of the problem of securing mass following for a conservative political party in a potentially democratic environment. In more advanced situations this problem has led to the obviously demagogic techniques of fascism. Late nineteenth century Britain after the enfranchisement of the rural laboring class still included many communities paternalistically and patriarchally organized around the leading landed family. A specious democratic adaptation, involving the more or less informal association of the gentry with the common people in programs of "educational" entertainment, was facilitated by the extreme dullness of rural life after the collapse of the agrarian agitations of the seventies. The Primrose League combined the paraphernalia of a lodge with an entertainment program which tended to fill the existing void. Based upon original manuscript records and files of publications of the League, this study appears to be a thorough and definitive job.

G.L.F.

An Introduction to Municipal Incorporation and Organization in Texas (Austin: The Bureau of Municipal Research, 1945, pp. 34.) is a useful summary of the laws for the incorporation of cities, towns, and villages in Texas, prefaced by descriptions of the usual types of municipal organization and an historical account of municipal incorporation provisions in Texas law. This pamphlet will form a valuable preliminary reference for citizens or officials interested in forming new cities or in modifying the organization or status of those already in existence. The study was prepared by Dr. Wilfred D. Webb, Research Assistant in the Bureau of Municipal Research of the University of Texas.

G.L.F.

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
AUSTIN

August 9, 1945

Dr. Wiley D. Rich, President
The Southwestern Social Science Association
Fort Worth, Texas
Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your request, I have audited the Association's records of cash received and disbursed. Receipts were verified by checking credits in the members accounts against deposits. All disbursements were made by checks properly drawn and paid by the band. The cash balance as of January 31, 1945, was confirmed by the depository. The membership list was not checked in detail, but test checks revealed that the list is accurately maintained.

As in the past no statement of assets is submitted as the Association has no assets other than cash and unsold Quarterlies. The latter asset is carried at no stated value, all receipts from the sale of back numbers being considered income in the year in which the sales are made.

Attached is a statement of receipts and disbursements for the year ending January 31, 1945.

Yours very truly,

JOHN ARCH WHITE
Chairman of Audit Committee

Southwestern Social Science Association

Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements

For the Year Ending January 31, 1945

RECEIPTS:

Membership:

Individual	\$ 487.00	
Libraries	585.75	
Sale of Individual Quarterlies.....	32.35	
Institutional Memberships	85.00	
"Rubber Checks" made good.....	6.00	
TOTAL RECEIPTS		\$1,196.10

EXPENDITURES:

Publication Costs:

March Quarterly	\$254.50	
June Quarterly	259.50	
September Quarterly	258.50	
December Quarterly	216.60	
Total		989.10
Postage	\$ 20.65	
Office Supplies	7.91	
Miscellaneous	10.10	
Bank charges	2.55	
Agents' fees	6.42	
TOTAL EXPENDITURES		1,036.73

EXCESS OF RECEIPTS OVER EXPENDITURES \$ 159.37

Cash Balance January 31, 1944.....	\$ 179.23
Increase in Cash for the year.....	159.37
Cash Balance January 31, 1945.....	\$338.60

